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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout various sectors of international law, transparency al-
ready plays an important role.' Given the fundamental structural changes
in the international legal order-particularly the shift from Westphalian
sovereignty to an international law of cooperation and integration-
states today face many new obligations arising from a rapidly growing
number of international legal instruments.2 Commentators have identi-
fied transparency as an essential concept to ensure compliance with
these obligations in a number of fields, including international transport
and communication, environmental protection, arms control, and debt
reduction.' Furthermore, transparency has become a subject of debates
concerning the democratic legitimacy of the changing international legal
order, particularly with respect to new obligations that arguably require
the partial transfer of sovereignty and previously national competences
to international regimes.
Transparency has received significant attention and continues to gain
importance in international, regional, and national legal regimes.5 The
current discussion of transparency in international law can be grouped
along three different contexts: (1) as a concept underlying obligations
international law places on a state's internal legal regimes and proce-
dures;6 (2) as a concept governing the relations between institutions and
1. See, e.g., the general overview given by Patricia I. Hansen, Transparency, Standards
of Review, and the Use of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1017, 1060 (1999).
2. See Jost Delbrick, Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal
Order: International Law in the Era of Globalization, 11 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPXISCHES RECHT 1 passim (2001) (Switz.).
3. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 135-
53 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, lime for a United Nations 'Global Compact'for
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European
Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621, 646 (2002); Jost Delbruck, Exercising Public Authority
Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 42 (2003).
5. On the international level, for instance, transparency is currently at the center of the
debate regarding the problem of corruption. See, e.g., Nikolay A. Ouzounov, Facing the Chal-
lenge: Corruption, State Capture and the Role of Multinational Business, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1181, 1198-99 (2004); Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economics in Transition: The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121 (1996). On the regional and national
level, the right of citizens to access information reflects the growing significance of the trans-
parency principle. See FRANK RIEMANN, DIE TRANSPARENZ DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION: DAS
NEUE RECHT AUF ZUGANG ZU DOKUMENTEN VON PARLAMENT, RAT UND KOMMISSION
(2004). But cf Bradley Pack, Note, FO1A Frustration: Access to Government Documents
Under the Bush Administration, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2004).
6. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Transpar-
ency: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, 16 et seq.,
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regimes of international law and member states;7 and (3) as a concept
denoting the openness of institutions and procedures of international law,
especially vis-a-vis international civil society.8
In international economic law, the notion of transparency is pre-
dominantly used in the latter sense. Critics of the manner in which
international economic agreements are negotiated, institutions are gov-
erned, or dispute settlements operate often invoke the proverbial "lack of
transparency" and allege a resulting illegitimacy or democratic deficit in
this field of law.9 Nevertheless, transparency is a recognized legal con-
cept in numerous transnational agreements in international economic
law; with regard to the GATT/WTO system, scholars have compared
transparency's significance to the highly prominent principles of national
treatment and most-favored nation status. ° Yet legal scholars so far have
been hesitant to engage in an in-depth analysis of the status of transpar-
ency as an independent legal principle that underlies comparable rules
across specific treaty platforms or segments of international economic
law."
UNCTAD/ITE/IIEF2003/4 (2004); Meinhard Hilf, Power Rules and Principles-Which Orien-
tation for WTO/GATT Law?, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111, 119 (2001).
7. See Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in Interna-
tional Regimes, 42 INT'L STUD. Q. 109 (1998); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and
International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 250-51 (1997); see also
Kenneth Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties
and Other InternationalAgreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1,40-45 (1993).
8. See Jose E. Alvarez, Editorial Comments, Hegemonic International Law Revisited,
97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 873, 876-88 (2003); Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy:
No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 489, 493 (2001); Doris Estelle Long, "Democratiz-
ing" Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 217, 259-68 (2002).
9. See John W. Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment of Criticisms Directed at the
International Monetary Fund, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 521 (2004); Julio A. Lacarte, Transparency,
Public Debate, and Participation by NGOs in the WTO: A WTO Perspective, 7 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 683, 686 (2004); Jeffrey Waincymer, Transparency of Dispute Settlement Within the World
Trade Organization, 24 MELB. U. L. RaV. 797 (2000); Whitney Debevoise, Access to Docu-
ments and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Suggestions for Greater
Transparency, 32 INT'L L. 817 (1998).
10. William B.T. Mock, An Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A
Tool for Rational Development, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 293, 295 (2000). See also WTO Work-
ing Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, WTO Work on Transparency in
Government Procurement: Second Annual Meeting of the OECD Anti-Corruption Network for
Transition Economies (Nov. 2, 1999), available at http://www.nobribes.org/Documents/
Istanbul99/Seattleprespack99proc.doc. For a detailed listing of the main provisions in inter-
national economic instruments that contain elements or expressions of the transparency
principle, see Part III.B. infra.
11. To be fair, however, Todd Weiler concludes in a recent, highly illuminating article
that "[t]he principle of transparency ... appears ripe for further review. [This] is a task to be
assigned to a future paper." See Todd Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principles of
International Economic Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 78 (2003). Furthermore,
some commentators have analyzed the underlying principle of transparency in the sphere of
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In the following Note, I will therefore undertake to address this la-
cuna and assess the current status of transparency as a principle
underlying the procedural and substantive obligations that international
economic law places upon states. 2 A better understanding of this aspect
of transparency may serve to foster a trend of convergence and coher-
ence in international economic law, thereby preventing fragmentation
and conflicting interpretations of similar norms.' 3 Moreover, due to its
economic implications, inter alia, this aspect of transparency is as vital
to the effective functioning of the international economic order as the
more prominent democracy-and legitimacy-related facet which pres-
ently dominates legal discourse."
In order to present a well-rounded account, this Note will first sketch
the theoretical underpinnings of transparency in an interdisciplinary
overview of its possible meanings and advantages in the present context.
It will then survey documents and instruments of international economic
law in which language embracing the transparency principle is already
present. The Note's main section proceeds to ask whether, in the actual
international trade law. See, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, 222-24, 248-51
(1991); Hilf, supra note 6, passim; Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the
World Trade Organization, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 927 (2004).
12. I use the term "procedural" to describe obligations that only influence the publica-
tion of a certain regulation or action without respect to its content, whereas "substantial"
obligations would actually determine what kind of regulation or action will or may be taken.
13. Regarding this "convergence trend" see Joseph H. H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a
Common Law of Trade, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 201, 202 (Joseph H.H. Weiler ed., 2000); as regards fragmentation
and cross-interpretation of similar norms, see generally Beate Rudolf, Unity and Diversity of
International Law in the Settlement of International Disputes, in UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 389 et seq. (Andreas Zimmermann & Rainer Hofmann eds., 2006) as
well as the other contributions in that volume; Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in
International Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); Nathan Miller, An International
Jurisprudence? The Operation of "Precedent" Across International Tribunals, 15 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 483 (2002).
14. The fact that this Note restricts its analysis to the transparency-related obligations
placed on states is of course not to suggest that all questions regarding transparency in interna-
tional economic decisionmaking and dispute settlement have been answered satisfactorily.
15. For the purpose of this Note, "international economic law" shall be limited to norms
of public international law which govern economic regulation and activity by states in their
relation not only to other states but predominantly to nonstate actors. "International economic
law" thus primarily consists of international trade and investment law. While this definition
excludes the fascinating developments belonging exclusively to the sphere of private interna-
tional law (i.e. the Lex Mercatoria), parallels to the law governing financial markets will
occasionally be drawn if it will further clarify a point. Otherwise, international economic law
should be understood more broadly as all law governing the international economy. For an
instructive discussion of the differing notions of international economic law, see Christian
Tietje, Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht und Recht auf Entwicklung als Elemente einer
[Vol. 27:579
application of those agreements, the transparency principle has had any
notable impact on the interpretation of state obligations. Finally, in ad-
dressing transparency's future role in international economic law, this
Note briefly discusses additional problems which might be resolved
through a transparency-based approach.
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE TRANSPARENCY PRINCIPLE
A. The Meaning of Transparency as a General Principle
Before the status of a principle in international economic law can be
adequately evaluated, it should be defined as precisely as possible. It is
not without irony, however, that there is a significant lack of clarity in
scholarly debate regarding the exact meaning of transparency'
6-it ap-
pears to be "non-transparent" or veiled itself. Nevertheless, this Note
will attempt to develop a working definition of the concept below.
Transparency in its most colloquial and natural meaning is a term of
analogy: a regulation, law, or legal procedure is transparent if it can be
seen through easily, "just as one can see easily through a clean win-
dow."'7 The process and effects of the legal instrument in question must
be readily understandable, and the scope of its derivative rights and obli-
gations must be easy to assess for the addressee and rights-holder
respectively; if it does not meet these criteria, the law in question is
deemed "opaque.' '
A more sophisticated abstract definition of transparency can emerge
from these general observations. In the context of their groundbreaking
discussion of factors contributing to compliance with international obli-
gations, Chayes and Chayes define transparency as
the availability and accessibility of knowledge and information
about: (1) the meaning of norms, rules, and procedures estab-
lished by the treaty and practice of the regime, and (2) the
policies and activities of parties to the treaty and of any central
konstitutionalisierten globalen Friedensordnung, in WELTINNENRECHT: LIBER AmICORUM
JOST DELBR0CK, 783, 786-99 (Klaus Dicke et al eds., 2005); Weiler, supra note 11, at 37-40.
16. In this respect, Sue Arrowsmith opines that this lack of clarity posed a "fundamental
obstacle to progress" to a multilateral transparency agreement in the field of government pro-
curement. See Sue Arrowsmith, Transparency in Government Procurement: The Objectives of
Regulation and the Boundaries of the WTO, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 283 (2003).
17. Mock, supra note 10, at 295; see also RLEMANN, supra note 5, at 18.
18. Mock, supra note 10, at 295.
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organs of the regime as to matters relevant to treaty compliance
and regime efficacy. 9
It is apparent, then, that transparency requires accessibility and clar-
ity not only with regard to a legal regime's treaty obligations but also to
the actions of relevant parties which could impair benefits flowing from
the provisions in question or otherwise impact the scope and operation
of the system. The latter interpretation of transparency resembles the one
widely applied in characterizations of financial markets, where
"[t]ransparency refers to the ability of market participants fairly to ob-
serve current and recent levels of market activity."2° In both cases,
transparency guarantees that concerned parties can easily acquire the
information they need in order to realistically estimate the effect of other
parties' actions on their own positions and planned undertakings.
In the context of government procurement, Steven Schooner defines
transparency as "a system [that] employs procedures by which offerers
and contractors (and even the public at large) ensure that government
business is conducted in an impartial and open manner."'" While this
definition implies the accessibility of information regarding the activities
of governments and thus is consistent with the definition developed
above, its emphasis on impartiality blurs the distinction between trans-
parency and the obligations of unbiased and non-discriminatory
treatment in procurement proceedings. Considering its implicit link to
legitimacy through public scrutiny, Schooner's definition therefore
seems-for the purpose of this Note-both too specific, as it embodies
substantive non-discrimination obligations, and too broad, as it includes
notions of openness vis-ai-vis the public at large. With regard to pro-
curement, it suffices to demand that the applicable rules and information
regarding planned procurement activities, policies, and opportunities are
clearly known to affected parties.23 Accordingly, transparency does not
itself specify what these policies should be or whether national treatment
or other rules and principles apply unless there is a direct impact on ac-
cess to information.2 4 It is important to note, however, that substantial
19. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 135.
20. See, e.g., JOHN BOARD ET AL., TRANSPARENCY AND FRAGMENTATION 25 (2002).
21. Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract
Law, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 103, 105 (2002).
22. For another approach that links transparency to non-discrimination, see KHURSHID
HYDER, EQUALITY OF TREATMENT AND TRADE DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
143-44 (1968).
23. See Sue Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Gov-
ernment Procurement, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 793, 796 (1998).
24. This is also the position of the European Communities in the current negotiations
on a multilateral procurement agreement. See the description of their position titled,
[Vol. 27:579
obligations formulated by such rules might very well demand such
25
openness.
Hence, there is no set definition of transparency in international eco-
nomic law. Beyond requiring that the relevant provisions of their internal
legal regimes be readily understandable and accessible, however, the
least the transparency principle conceptually demands from involved
parties and systems is openness and the provision to other interested par-
ties of critical information that could affect their positions.26 The
underlying reason for this obligation is to enable interested parties to
take business and legal actions with full knowledge of the relevant
facts-including facts to which they would not have access without the
cooperation of the party bound by obligations expressing the transpar-
ency principle.
It should be noted, however, that the way in which parties make this
information available should generally remain within their discretion
unless otherwise agreed upon in the relevant treaty. That is to say, if do-
mestic legislation affects the position of foreign investors protected by
international treaties, the easily accessible publication of the legislation
in question might very well suffice; a compulsory request mechanism as
envisioned in drafts of the Multilateral Agreement on Investments
(MAI), by which contracting parties could demand information regard-
ing laws and regulations from other contracting parties," seems too
ambitious and beyond the current threshold for transparency in interna-
tional law.
Thus, taking these considerations into account, the working defini-
tion of transparency adopted for the purpose of this Note draws mainly
from the important insights of Chayes and Chayes. Their definition,
however, is formulated so as to fit international regimes and systems in
general, whereas this Note aims to analyze exclusively the field of inter-
national economic law. Hence, in addition to the criteria developed by
Chayes and Chayes, this Note will consider the impact of increased
knowledge and information on the decisions of economic players-be
they states or private actors-when discussing the transparency of a law
or system. Whereas the general concept of transparency aims at matters
of compliance (enabling parties to exercise control over their activities in
"Transparency in Government Procurement," http://trade-info.cec.eu.intldoclib/docs/2003/
september/tradocI 13686.pdf.
25. See infra Part II.C for a discussion about the interpretation of fair and equitable
treatment clauses.
26. See Megan A. Kinsey, Transparency in Government Procurement: An International
Consensus? 34 PuB. CONT. L.J. 163 (2004).
27. See Teresa McGhie, Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF FOREIGN DIREcT INVESTMENT 107, 131 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds.,
1999).
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accordance with existing obligations), this Note strives to emphasize the
ex ante effect of transparency-the ability of parties to take action with
full, accurate, reliable, and complete information and knowledge of the
relevant framework.28
B. Interdisciplinary Aspects of Transparency
Transparency as a legal concept has many interdisciplinary implica-
tions which promise vast benefits for legal theory and practice if
incorporated properly.29 Hence, even though it is beyond the scope of this
Note to explore fully all of these possible linkages in detail, this Part
shall briefly discuss the main interdisciplinary implications of transpar-
ency. This discussion aims to facilitate an understanding of the function
and scope of the transparency provisions included in the agreements ana-
lyzed below.
1. Economics
Given this Note's focus on transparency in international economic
law, a survey of the interdisciplinary connections to the field of econom-
ics is an obvious starting point for this discussion. Classical economic
theory assumes man acts as homo economicus, trying to maximize his
subjective utility by means of rational choice. The rationality of this
choice, however, is a function of what is known to the individual eco-
nomic actor at the time of his decision.' Therefore, because the degree
of a market's transparency determines the amount of information avail-
able to market participants, transparency also directly influences the
outcome of rational choices.32
More specifically, economic methods such as contract theory, prin-
cipal-agent theory, and the economics of information can measure and
describe the function of transparency.33 For instance, without going into
28. In this way, transparency has a certain predictability component-i.e., transparency
obliges states to disclose policy and regulatory information which enables economic actors to
foresee with a certain degree of security how those states will respond to their actions and
handle investment decisions.
29. Mock, supra note 10, at 295.
30. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5, 153 (1976).
31. Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat Choice, 80 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1091,
1094 et seq. (2005).
32. Many classical rational choice models therefore assume full, adequate, and com-
plete knowledge ("perfect information"). See AVERY W. KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 256 (1998).
33. John Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International
Relations Theory, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CONTINUING REVOLUTION 235, 257 (Sue
Arrowsmith & Martin Trybus eds., 2003).
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more detailed economic analysis, the incentive effect of the level of
transparency on a private investor's decision to enter into a contract with
a government is intuitive: "investors and lenders require a predictable
framework of rules in which commercial activity and lending activity
will be conducted, including accessible and comprehensive legal rules
which are actually applied and the breach of which gives rise to sanc-
tions., 35 If transparency-and its resulting predictability-is missing,
market actors will most likely incur significant costs when trying to ob-
tain and analyze relevant information.36 In particular, these costs might
arise when potential investors are forced to hire expensive local agents to
acquire regulatory information, "test" regulators with preliminary busi-
ness moves, or, if unpredictable local officials hold significant discretion,
engage in "grease payments" to secure a certain interpretation or appli-
cation of the law.3 7 Thus, just as transparency facilitates efficiency within
financial markets, 38 a transparent legal framework also promotes effi-
ciency in the allocation of global investment decisions by reducing
unnecessary transaction costs. When weighing financial returns and
costs connected with conducting business in or with a certain state,
global businesspersons will consider a high level of transparency to be
an economic incentive to invest.
39
2. Game Theory
Closely associated with these basic economic observations are the
insights that game theory can provide to enrich the analysis of transpar-
ency. As James Morrow explains, "[g]ame theory provides a way to
formalize social structures and examine the effects of structure on indi-
vidual decisions."' Accordingly, game theory is not only helpful in
identifying the conditions under which transparency facilitates coordina-
tion and cooperation between state parties to an economic agreement, 1
but also in modeling the decision-making processes of individual private
economic actors.
34. For a famous explanation of the effect incomplete information and information
asymmetries can have on markets, see George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons, 84 Q.J. OF
ECON. 488-500 (1970).
35. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE: PROMOTING SOUND DEVELOPMENT
MANAGEMENT 16 (1997).
36. Information acquisition costs can constitute a truly significant portion of the overall
costs of reaching a decision. See Brian L. Dos Santos & Vijay S. Mookeijee, Expert System
Design: Minimizing Information Acquisition Costs, 9 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 161, 162
(1993).
37. Mock, supra note 10, at 303.
38. See BOARD ET AL., supra note 20, at 179.
39. See Mock, supra note 10, at 303--04.
40. JAMES D. MoRRow, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 1 (1999).
41. Linarelli, supra note 33, at 257.
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Central to an application of game theory is the distinction between
games of "perfect" information and games of "imperfect" information. 2
Whereas games of perfect information allow each player to act with full
knowledge of the relevant facts, games of imperfect information demand
that they analyze incomplete information in order to draw conclusions
regarding unavailable facts.4 '3 Not only does this lead to additional costs
associated with the gathering, evaluating, and deducing of further infor-
mation, it also creates the possibility for signaling-and, more
importantly, for inverted signaling or bluffing as well."
Thus, an opaque system not only increases transaction costs but also
carries the inherent danger that one party will use deceptive techniques
to induce another party to engage in an investment, for instance. As a
result, games of imperfect information will often produce distorted out-
comes which do not adequately reflect genuine choices. Accordingly,
transparency is an important factor in preventing these opportunities to
deceive and the resultant distortions. Since legal systems provide for a
defined set of actors, rules, and rewards,46 and can feature perfect or im-
perfect information, game theory analysis is perfectly applicable to
them.4 ' Therefore, in sum, a transparent legal system or regulation allows
individuals to assess the possible consequences and conditions of their
actions without having to rely on signaling by politicians, bureaucrats,
and judges.48
This overview of transparency's implications for economics and
game theory has shown that the principle's inherent notions of knowl-
edge and information warrant an interdisciplinary approach when
analyzing its relevance for individual decisionmakers.4 9 This fact shall
42. Mock, supra note 10, at 298. Mock helpfully explains this distinction by contrasting
bridge and chess. Whereas the identity of the remaining cards that the other players hold is
unknown, making bridge a game of imperfect information, chess is a game of perfect informa-
tion: no matter what the intentions of the opponent may be, "stronger players are aware of the
fact that it is the potential risks and opportunities on the chessboard that matter, not any plans
the opponent may make." Id. at 300.
43. MORROW, supra note 40, at 217.
44. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND EcONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 53-55 (1947).
45. In this respect, one can think of assurances from government officials to potential
private investors that seem to clarify the legal framework-guaranteeing the granting of per-
mits, for instance-but eventually do not hold true. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United
Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 209 (2001) [hereinafter Metalclad, Final
Award], which will be discussed in further detail infra Part III.B. 1.
46. Mock, supra note 10, at 300.
47. For numerous applications of game theory to the law, see DOUGLAS C. BAIRD,
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
48. Mock, supra note 10, at 300.
49. In addition to the effects on individual economic actors which are the main concern
of this Note, interdisciplinary study of economics and game theory credits transparency in
[Vol. 27:579
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inform the following examination of the role of the transparency princi-
ple in international economic law.
C. Transparency as a Principle of
International Economic Law
Having sketched the theoretical foundations of the transparency
principle in general, this Note will survey agreements and treaties in in-
ternational economic law to determine the extent to which they feature
expressions of this principle. This survey is limited to an overview of
provisions and clauses that seem to incorporate aspects of transparency,
leaving Part IH to analyze whether those provisions as actually applied
indeed justify a conclusion that the transparency principle exists as an
independent legal principle in international economic law. 0
1. World Trading System
The first regulatory area to be surveyed is the world trading system,
as primarily established by the GATT/WTO legal order. This Note has
briefly discussed the impact economics can have on calculations and
rational choices by economic actors and shown how opacity can cause
significant additional costs.-' Accordingly, trade is a field where high
transaction costs created by a lack of information or unclear regulations
might render concessions virtually worthless. A lack of transparency
could deter the influx of foreign products, thus making it functionally
equivalent to a tariff--one could describe it as a non-tariff barrier."
Hence, given this state of affairs, intuitively one would expect many pro-
visions dealing with aspects of transparency in trade law.
legal systems for inducing compliance because it "facilitates co-ordination ... among inde-
pendent actors;" "provides reassurance to actors that others are not taking advantage of them;"
and "exercises deterrence against actors contemplating non-compliance." MIRiAN KENE
OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER 165 (1999).
50. While this Note opts to survey legal texts and then proceed separately to actual case
law, some have argued that international economic law is a field of law where the inductive
case analysis is particularly promising and could yield "a series of optional principles of con-
siderable theoretical significance and practical importance." GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE
INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1965).
51. See Part II.B. 1. supra.
52. Regarding the main normative principles governing the treatment of non-tariff
barriers in WTO law, see CHRISTIAN TIETJE, NORMATIVE GRUNDSTRUKTUREN DER
BEHANDLUNG NICHT-TARIFARER HANDELSHEMMNISSE IN DER WTO/GATT-RECHTSORDNUNG:
EINE UNTERSUCHUNG UNTER BESONDERER BERUrCKSICHTIGUNG DES COUNTERTRADES (1998).
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a. Existing Legal Framework
Within the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),53 there were a number of provisions that could be characterized
as encompassing aspects of transparency as defined above. The most
prominent of these provisions is article X, which in its pertinent part
reads:
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings
of general application, made effective by any contracting party,
pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for
customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or
to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or ex-
ports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their
sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, in-
spection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be
published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments
and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements affect-
ing international trade policy which are in force between the
government or a governmental agency of any contracting party
and the government or governmental agency of any other con-
tracting party shall also be published.4
The requirement that measures affecting international trade and
agreements affecting trade policy be published is reiterated in article
X:2, which clarifies that new charges and other burdensome require-
ments must not be enforced until they have been published. 5 Finally,
article X:3(a) stipulates that all said measures be applied in a "uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner."56 The requirement to publish the
measures in question is a clear expression of the transparency principle,
for it not only aims at providing for compliance control but also enables
economic actors to assess the impact these laws might have on their eco-
nomic prospects. Moreover, while the obligation to administer the laws
impartially could be considered a rule independent and distinct from
transparency, the requirement of uniformity in application has a consid-
erable predictability component and can thus also be viewed as another
expression of the transparency principle.57
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
54. Id. art. X: 1 (emphasis added).
55. Id. art. X:2.
56. Id. art. X:3(a).
57. Too much discretion on the side of administrative officials may result in non-
transparent application and can thus result in insecurity costs, even if one excludes the practice
of "grease money." See supra Part I.B. 1.
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In addition to the mainly procedural transparency requirements en-
shrined in article X, some substantive GATT provisions reflect the
transparency principle as well. For example, the transparency principle
motivates article XI:I, which stipulates that all non-tariff barriers be
eliminated ("tariffs only maxim"); this requirement exists because the
effect of tariff barriers on trade is more obvious and visible than non-
tariff barriers. 8 Just as the contracting parties will be able to adopt more
principled negotiation positions and supervise compliance more effec-
tively once they are aware of the true economic significance of the
barriers, businesspeople pondering imports or exports and consumers
eventually paying for the good can more easily evaluate the effects of a
straightforward tariff barrier than the effects of countless--quite likely
hidden or at least more subtle-non-tariff barriers.5 9
This latter point is also well-reflected in GATT" article VIII: 1 (b) and
(c), in which the contracting parties "recognize the need for reducing the
number and diversity of fees and charges"' as well as for "minimizing
the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for
decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation require-
ments."6' In sum, these provisions are concerned with reducing non-tariff
barriers and transaction costs associated with non-transparent or unnec-
62essarily complex formalities.
As far as procedural transparency requirements are concerned, many
of the more recent WTO agreements not only echo the publication re-
quirements but also go beyond those found in the original GATT.63 For
example, both the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)6 and
58. Mock, supra note 10, at 296.
59. Hansen, supra note 1, at 1059.
60. GATr, supra note 53, art. VIII: I (b).
61. Id. art. VIII:l(c).
62. In addition to these examples expressing general GATT rules, safeguard and excep-
tion clauses contain publication requirements regarding the respective measures as well. See,
e.g., GATr art. XI:2(c) (exception for agricultural and fishery quotas); GATT art. XII:4(a)
(balance-of-payments consultations); GATT art. XIII:3 (public notice requirement for fixed
quotas).
63. The Uruguay Round (1994) established the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
added several multi- and plurilateral agreements to and "legalized" the provisorium GATr.
Thus, the broad spectrum of trade is now regulated in much more detail and is more legalized
than in the GATT. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: of Constituents, Competence
and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 979, 1010 (2001).
64. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter TBT], Dec. 15, 1993, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27, at 22053
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND VOI. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)65 require
states not only to publish the ultimately adopted standards but also to
provide for a reasoned explanation and a priori opportunities for foreign
governments to comment and discuss the proposed standards. These
comments must then be taken into account during the decision-making
process.6 Thus, these provisions ensure the standards are adopted in a
transparent manner, allowing for interested parties to utilize their respec-
tive governments to submit comments and positions in order to influence
the outcome. Even if they are unsuccessful, however, this framework
guarantees that private economic actors-assuming their own govern-
ments transmit the relevant information to them-learn about the
proposed standards as soon as possible and consequently can adjust fea-
tures of their products (or their business plans in general) in a timely
fashion without incurring unnecessary information costs. This signifi-
cantly enhances the smooth functioning of the international trading
regime. Accordingly, the agreements on Government Procurement
(GPA), Antidumping Duties (AD), Subsidies and Countervailing Meas-
ures (SCM), Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property (TRIPs), and Safeguards contain similar provisions.67
The agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round add further sub-
stantive expressions of the transparency principle as well. For instance,
article 2.8 of the TBT requires members to base their technical regula-
tions on product performance rather than on product design. Informing
foreign producers what performance outcome is expected from their
product clarifies the relevant standard, in contrast to design regulations
which do not necessarily reflect their true regulatory objectives in a clear
manner.61 In a similar fashion, the SPS stipulates that standards should be
"based on scientific principles" and must not be maintained without
"sufficient scientific evidence."69 The rationale for this obligation flows
from the transparency principle: Even though it is indeed debatable
whether science is always rational and objective,70 scientific standards
65. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [hereinafter
SPS], Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 64, Annex 1 (A).
66. See, e.g., TBT, supra note 64, art. 2.9.2; SPS, supra note 65, arts. 2.2, 2.3, 5.8, 7,
12.4.
67. See the enumeration provided by Hansen, supra note 1, at 1059 n.233.
68. Id. at 1060.
69. SPS, supra note 65, art. 2.2.
70. In the context of risk assessment, the WTO Appellate Body acknowledged the prob-
lem of "objective science" by allowing Members to base their measures in good faith on a
"divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources," thereby clarifying that
"mainstream" science was not the only acceptable scientific base. See Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products "Hormones," WTI
DS26, 28/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), para. 194.
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nevertheless are subject to verification and thus transparent in what they
demand from a product-and when their requirements are met. It is cer-
tainly easier for a producer of a good to adjust his line of production to a
published scientific standard than to one that is based on political or
other non-verifiable notions, where no matter how hard he tries to con-
form, there still remains a degree of uncertainty as to whether the
competent authorities will acknowledge this conformity. Hence, the SPS
requirement to base standards on scientific principles, accompanied by
the obligations regarding prior risk assessment and the prohibition of
arbitrary distinctions between comparable risks,7' functions as a guaran-
tee that traders can predict and assess a priori whether their good is in
conformity with the standards or not. In other words, these requirements
guarantee a considerable amount of transparency.
b. Transparency as a Controversial Issue on
the Current Negotiation Agenda
Despite a number of provisions in existing WTO agreements tai-
lored, inter alia, to provide for transparency, the principle has recently
been the subject of controversial discussion among members. At the De-
cember 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, the Working
Group on Transparency in Government Procurement (Working Group)
was created with the mandate to conduct "a study on transparency in
government procurement practices, taking into account national policies,
and, based on this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appro-
priate agreement."" Thus, even though there currently exists a
plurilateral General Procurement Agreement (GPA),73 the Working
Group aims to develop a multilateral treaty and expand the ideas already
addressed in the present GPA, with an explicit focus on transparency
issues . More specifically, there are twelve main issues on the Working
Group's agenda: (1) definition and scope of government procurement;
(2) procurement methods; (3) publication and information on national
regulations and procedures; (4) information on procurement opportunities,
tendering, and qualification procedures; (5) time periods; (6) transparency
71. SPS, supra note 65, arts. 3.3, 5.1, 5.5.
72. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, para. 21, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/gproc-e/gpmande.htm.
73. Agreement on Government Procurement [hereinafter GPA], WTO Agreement, su-
pra note 64, Annex 4(b). Those WTO agreements which are not signed by all Members are
called "plurilateral," as opposed to the multilateral acquis contained in the single undertaking
package and consequently signed by all Members.
74. WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, Report of the
Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement to the General Council,
WT/WGTGP/7 (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/gproc-e/
gptrane.htm.
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of decisions on qualifications; (7) transparency of decisions on contract
awards; (8) domestic review procedures; (9) other matters related to
transparency, such as, inter alia, language, the fight against bribery and
corruption, and maintenance of record proceedings; (10) notification
procedures; (11) WTO settlement procedures; and (12) technical coop-
eration with and special and differential treatment of developing states.
The Doha Declaration has also explicitly reiterated the commitment to
increased transparency in this field,"6 although there is still considerable
disagreement among members regarding many issues.7
One disagreement among members concerns what constitutes "gov-
ernment procurement" for the purposes of the agreement and, closely
connected with this question, whether transparency disciplines should
apply to the whole scope of procurement, be subject to a de minimis rule,
or only apply in fields determined by individual governments. 78 Thus, the
discussion arising in this context centers around four considerations:
(1) who is doing the procurement; (2) whether goods or services are pro-
cured; (3) what types of transactions are covered; and (4) whether the
Agreement should introduce threshold values for procurement con-
tracts. 9 Throughout the discussion, one can identify a group of members
(India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Egypt) who are generally skeptical of the
agreement and consequently argue in favor of narrow interpretations and
scope, high thresholds, and no obligations regarding the publication of
national legislation." In contrast, members with domestic laws guaran-
teeing transparency, such as the states of the European Community and
the United States, by and large try to include similar provisions in the
multilateral procurement agreement. The draft text submitted by Hun-
gary, Korea, Singapore, and the United States is one example of this pro-
transparency approach." Underlying the conflict between the two groups
is the suspicion of many developing states that the transparency agree-
ment really aims at securing market access for industrialized states.2
75. WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, Report of the
Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement to the General Council, para. 3,
VT/WGTGP/4 (Oct. 21, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/gproce/
gptran.e.htm.
76. WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, para. 26, VT/M1N(01)/DEC/l (Nov. 20,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/minOl-e/nindecl-e.htm.
77. See the issue-by-issue account delivered by Kinsey, supra note 26, at 162-70.
78. WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, Report on the
Meeting of 7 June 2000 - Note by the Secretariat, paras. 19-30, WT/WGTGP/M/10 (Aug. 1,
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc--e/gptran-e.htm.
79. See Kinsey, supra note 26, at 164-66.
80. Arrowsmith, supra note 16, at 286.
81. See Report on the Meeting of 7 June 2000, supra note 78, para. 34.
82. See Kinsey, supra note 26, at 170-72. This debate touches on the question of
whether transparency is a principle that merely guides the interpretation of existing obliga-
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Consequently, the agreement shared the fate of the other Singapore is-
sues--competition, trade facilitation, and investment-and assumed the
role of a deal-breaker during the Cancun Ministerial Meeting.83 It thus
remains to be seen how future negotiations on this agreement will fare.
In any event, the creation of the Working Group and the ongoing debate
demonstrate that transparency is an important issue for discussion in the
multilateral framework of international trade regulation.
2. International Investment Law
We have seen that transparency has a major impact on the business
decisions of potential investors." Given this reality, it is not surprising
that in the context of international investment law, expressions of the
transparency principle can be found in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),5 the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),86 and countless
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 7
NAFTA contains a number of provisions in line with the definition
of transparency developed in this Note." The preamble of NAFTA em-
phasizes the rationale of transparency-which is, inter alia, to ensure
predictability. In it, the state parties resolve to "ESTABLISH clear and
mutually advantageous rules governing their trade; [and] ENSURE a
predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment
,,89
Accordingly, this general embrace of the transparency principle con-
tinues in further detail in the body of the treaty. While generally not
establishing parameters for substantive domestic laws, NAFTA contains
tions or whether it actually represents an "additive" to the minimum standards customary
international law establishes. In this respect, see the debate ignited by certain NAFTA awards,
infra Parts II.C.2, Il.C.3.
83. See, in this respect, the analysis of the negotiations provided by Steve Woolcock,
The Singapore Issues in Cancun: a Failed Negotiation Ploy or a Litmus Test for Global Gov-
ernance?, 38 INTERECONOMICS 249 (2003); and the elements of a possible multilateral WTO
procurement framework consequently examined by Victor Mosoti, The WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement: A Necessary Evil in the Legal Strategy for Development in the Poor
World? 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 593, 628 et seq. (2004).
84. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
85. North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFIA], Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289.
86. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 381 [hereinafter ECT].
87. Currently, there are over 2200 BITs in force. For an instructive overview in this
regard, see DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 1, 17-20 (2005). For a detailed discussion
of BITs, see RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
(1995); Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW 655 (1990).
88. See discussion supra Part I.B.
89. NAFrA, supra note 85, preamble (emphasis added).
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many procedural obligations which seek to enable governments of other
parties and foreign investors to understand the domestic rule-making
process and possibly provide input.90 Thus, even though the specific con-
tent of laws remains largely at the discretion of the parties, the formation
and application of those laws and regulations must be transparent. 9' In the
same vein, article 102(1) explicitly mentions transparency as one of the
"principles and rules" of the agreement, placing the transparency principle
on the same level as national and most-favored-nation treatment.92 These
principles and rules "elaborate" the objectives of NAFTA, 93 thereby explic-
itly functioning as interpretative devices. 4 While this interpretative
function of transparency arguably underlies all of NAFTA, most of the
obligations clearly connected to transparency are in chapter 18.9'
Specifically, article 1802 contains the duty to ensure prompt and ad-
vance publication of laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative
rulings of general nature,96 and article 1801 spells out the obligation to
establish contact points to facilitate communication between parties.97
The most striking notification requirement, however, is in article 1803.
Under the heading "Notification and Provision of Information," this arti-
cle stipulates:
1. To the maximum extent possible, each Party shall notify any
other Party with an interest in the matter of any proposed or ac-
tual measure that the Party considers might materially affect
the operation of this Agreement or otherwise substantially af-
fect that other Party's interests under this Agreement.
2. On request of another Party, a Party shall promptly provide in-
formation and respond to questions pertaining to any actual or
proposed measure, whether or not that other Party has been
previously notified of that measure.
3. Any notification or information provided under this Article
shall be without prejudice as to whether the measure is con-
98sistent with this Agreement.
90. OMALU, supra note 49, at 176.
91. Id.
92. NAFrA, supra note 85, art. 102(1).
93. Id.
94. Id. art 102(2); see also Weiler, supra note 11, at 46-47.
95. The debate regarding whether transparency is limited to the provisions contained in
chapter 18 became virulent in the Metalclad appeal before Canadian courts. See Metalclad,
Final Award, supra note 45, which will be analyzed in further detail infra Part II.C. 1.
96. NAFTA, supra note 85, art. 1802.
97. Id. art. 1801.
98. Id. art. 1803.
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This provision is noteworthy in at least two respects. For one, the no-
tification requirement encompasses "proposed" measures without
clarifying the concept. For example, it does not specify how far in the
legislative process the measure must be to qualify as a "proposed" meas-
ure. In addition, with a view to article 1803(2), which enshrines a right
to request information from other parties even in the absence of prior
notification, it seems that, depending on how narrowly or broadly one
construes the definition of "proposed measure," domestic policy discus-
sion of potential measures could be severely restricted by the obligation
to notify "to the maximum extent possible" any party whose interests
might be substantially affected.99 It would thus be valuable to determine
in which cases parties have actually "considered" the interests of other
substantially affected parties and thus notified them on their own initia-
tive rather than responding to a request for information under article
1803(2).
In addition to these procedural transparency provisions, it should be
noted that tribunals have interpreted substantive provisions of NAFTA,
such as article 1105(1) (containing the obligation to fair and equitable
treatment), in light of the transparency principle.' °° In the same vein, this
Note argues that, due to its overarching purpose of creating predictability
and facilitating trade and investment, NAFTA has created a multilateral
framework in which the teleological interpretation of substantive obliga-
tions should regularly consider the transparency principle, given its
positive impact on predictability and trade and investment decisions.' °'
The considerations that generally inform investors' need for a
transparent legal framework when making investment decisions
specifically apply with regard to the transition states of Eastern Europe,
which historically have produced rapidly changing and non-transparent
legislation.'Accordingly, the ECT contains extensive expressions of the
transparency principle, including its article 20, labeled "Transparency."
99. See id.
100. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45. While the Metalclad award is the most fa-
mous, it is not the only case where a tribunal has subscribed to this interpretation. See the case
survey infra Part I.C.
101. Note, however, that the NAFTA Free Trade Commission reacted to the awards
granted in the Metalclad Case and others by issuing Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chap-
ter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-
Interpr-en.asp. This interpretative note holds that the concepts of "fair and equitable treat-
ment" and "full protection and security" as used in chapter 11 of NAFTA "do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens." Moreover, a breach of another NAFTA provision
should not as such establish a breach of NAFTA article 1105 (1). The validity and impact of
this will be discussed in further detail in Part II.C. infra, in a section that addresses the actual
case law.
102. OMALU, supra note 49, at 178.
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The first paragraph of this provision brings laws, regulations, and other
measures of general application under the transparency disciplines of
GATT; the second paragraph then stipulates that these measures be
published promptly "to enable the Contracting Parties and Investors to
become acquainted with them."1 °3 While article 20 limits the class of
measures subject to this transparency requirement to those "made
effective," thus not reaching as far as the "proposed measures" under
NAFTA norms, it is noteworthy that the article explicitly mentions
investors as beneficiaries of transparency. Finally, the third paragraph of
article 20 closely resembles the corresponding NAFTA provisions by
creating an obligation to establish enquiry points to which requests for
information about pertinent laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and
administrative rulings may be addressed."'4
In addition to the concentrated obligations contained in article 20 of
the ECT, a number of other provisions also reflect the transparency prin-
ciple. Article 10, paragraph 1 spells out the rationale for the general
obligations of the ECT, stating that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create sta-
ble, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of
other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area."''0 5 Moreover,
article 18, paragraph 4 links facilitation of investment to transparency by
requiring parties to "undertake to facilitate access to energy resources,
inter alia, by allocating in a non-discriminatory manner on the basis of
published criteria authorizations, licences, concessions and contracts to
prospect and explore for or to exploit or extract energy resources.' 6
The numerous BITs concluded between states also regularly include
transparency guarantees. To name but one, article 11(7) of the U.S. Model
BIT used until the end of 2004 contained the obligation to "make public
all laws, regulations, administrative practices and procedures, and adjudi-
catory decisions that pertain to or affect investments," while the new 2004
U.S. Model BIT goes further by basically incorporating the complete in-
vestment chapter provisions of free trade agreements concluded by the
United States since 2002. '07 Thus, not surprisingly, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) survey on bilateral
103. ECT, supra note 86, art. 20 para. 2.
104. Id. art. 20 para. 3.
105. Id. art. 10 para. 1 (emphasis added).
106. Id. art. 18 para. 4 (emphasis added).
107. Art. H (7) of the "old" version is reprinted in BisHoP, CRAWFORD & REISMAN, supra
note 87, at 1166. The new U.S. Model BIT not only includes a similar provision in article 10;
article 11, labeled "Transparency," explicitly introduces a detailed obligation for parties to set up
"contact points" and provide for transparency and participation throughout all proceedings that
could impact the investment. See 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Sectors/Investment/Mode-BIT/asset-upload-fie847-6897.pdf.
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investment treaties in the mid-1990s reported a widespread proliferation
of comparable BIT clauses'°s and explicitly recognized the economic
incentives connected with transparency and predictability: "foreign in-
vestors are more likely to invest in a country if they believe that they can
ascertain accurately the laws that will govern their investments.""
9
3. International Financial Law
To conclude its survey of textual evidence of the transparency prin-
ciple, this Note briefly turns to international financial law. Principle 27
of the Principles of Securities Regulation by the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissioners holds that "[r]egulation should
promote transparency in trading. ' " In contrast to the trade and invest-
ment framework analyzed above, however, this sector of international
law does not feature binding international agreements between states but
rather non-binding and aspirational best governance agreements between
security regulators."' Given this state of affairs, it is even more remark-
able that despite their nonbinding nature, transparency principles shape
the vast majority of domestic financial markets."' This demonstrates the
widespread acceptance of the values of transparency with regard to the
facilitation of economic transactions.
III. THE TRANSPARENCY PRINCIPLE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PANELS AND TRIBUNALS
Having sketched the theoretical and textual framework of the
transparency principle in international economic law, the question
remains: to what extent have tribunals applied this principle when
interpreting obligations--or even when formulating substantive
108. UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, 65-66, U.N. Doc. No.
UNCTAD/ITE/rUTn (1998), reprinted in BISHOP, CRAWFORD & REISMAN, supra note 87, at
1166.
109. Id.
110. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES REGULATORS (IOSCO), OBJEC-
TIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf.
111. See id. at 4:
IOSCO members through their endorsement of this document express their com-
mitment to the objectives and principles it sets out. Insofar as it is within their
authority, they intend to use their best endeavours within their jurisdiction to ensure
adherence to those principles. To the extent that current legislation, policy or regu-
latory arrangements may impede adherence to these principles, they intend that
changes should be sought.
112. See the latest report on the implementation of the IOSCO principles in the annual
report of the organization, available at http://www.iosco.org/annual-report/docs/index1 .html.
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obligations? The following Part considers this question through the lens
of case law.
A. GAIT
This Part first analyzes the relevant case law under GATT, focusing
on three cases in particular: one from the old GATT era and two decided
by the Appellate Body under the WTO legal order.
1. Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products
In this case, the United States challenged a complex Japanese system
of import licenses for certain agricultural products."3 While primarily
alleging the absence of a justification for Japan's quantitative restric-
tions, the United States also, as a subordinate point, argued that "the
failure of Japan to publish adequate and timely information on quota
volume or value was inconsistent with articles X and XIII, and that the
import quotas were not administered in a reasonable manner as required
by article X:3."' The United States developed its claim with regard to
transparency in detail, arguing that the lack of information in general and
the resulting inability of companies to understand, much less to predict,
the allocation of quotas and to adjust their business plans accordingly
amounted to unreasonable quota administration in violation of GATT
article X:3." 5 With regard to this claim, however, the United States be-
came a victim of its own success: The Panel found that the Japanese
restrictions indeed lacked justification and thus declined to further rule
on their reasonable administration and the publication requirements.
1 6
Nevertheless, in accordance with the argument made above in favor
of more transparent tariffs over nontransparent and difficult to calculate
quotas, the Panel took note that "the import restrictions maintained by
Japan had been in place for decades and there was, therefore, no previ-
ous period free of restrictions in which the shares of imports and
domestic supplies could reasonably be assumed to resemble those which
would prevail today."' " In other words, the Panel at least recognized that
the level of protection quotas awarded was virtually impossible to calcu-
late, a difficulty which in itself impedes trade and contradicts the aim of
113. Panel Report, Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products
(Mar. 22, 1988) GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1989). The description of the system and
how quotas were assigned alone took the panel more than twenty pages.
114. Id. para. 3.1.1.
115. Id. paras. 3.5.1, 3.5.4.
116. Id. para. 5.4.2.
117. Id. para. 5.1.3.7.
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a transparent trading system." 8 The Panel did not, however, determine
whether a lack of transparency could be reconciled with the reasonable
administration of quotas.
2. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products
Due to its implications for the "Trade and Environment" and "Trade
and Development" debates, the Turtle/Shrimp case" 9 has probably
gained more attention than any other WTO case, leaving the realm of
international trade law experts and entering public debate in civil soci-
ety.'20 Yet while commentators have universally recognized the
importance of this case with respect to the relationship between free
trade and regulatory measures under article XX of the GATT,'21 the main
focus of their scholarship has rarely been on the ruling's transparency
component. 122
In Turtle/Shrimp, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand challenged
U.S. regulations and interpretation guidelines issued pursuant to the En-
dangered Species Act, which not only mandated the use of turtle
excluder devices (TEDs) for U.S. fishers but also established an import
ban on shrimp that had been harvested without the use of TEDs.
123
Unless the United States could justify the measure under article XX of
the GATT, the import ban would violate article XI: 1.24 As far as trans-
parency is concerned, it is important to at least sketch the Appellate
Body's analysis with regard to the chapeau of article XX-i.e., the man-
ner in which article XX is to be applied. The chapeau requires that all
measures taken with a view to article XX must "not [be] applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
118. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 1059.
119. See Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/R, DSR 1998:VII 2821 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Turtle/Shrimp]. The
panel report was appealed on July 13, 1998, and consequently overruled in parts. See Appel-
late Body Report, Turtle/Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII 2755 (Oct. 12, 1998). The
following analysis will deal exclusively with the Appellate Body Report.
120. See, e.g., Editorial, Messages for the WTO., N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 2, 1999 at A34 (link-
ing the violent protests during the WTO Ministerial Meeting 1998 in Seattle in part to public
concern raised by the Turtle/Shrimp decision).
121. See Arthur Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 477
(1999); Robert H. Howse, The Turtles Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, 32
J. WORLD TRADE 73 (1998). See also this Note's proposal infra Part I.D.
122. But see Chamovitz, supra note 11, at 935; and Weiler, supra note 11, at 78, for
notable exceptions in this regard.
123. Turtle/Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), supra note 119, paras. 2-6.
124. Id. paras. 7, 111-24, 188.
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discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
[be] a disguised restriction on international trade . ,,5
The Appellate Body scrutinized the U.S. requirements which made
import of shrimp products conditional on certification. In order to re-
ceive the certification in question, all states interested in exporting their
shrimp products to the United States had to adopt a comprehensive do-
mestic regulatory regime virtually identical to the U.S. model. 6 In
addition to other problematic aspects of the U.S. requirements, the Ap-
pellate Body specifically found they did not establish a "transparent,
predictable certification process" and lacked any "formal opportunity for
an applicant country to be heard, or to respond to any argument that has
been made against it . 1.2.."7 Moreover, the U.S. regime rendered no
formal decisions nor provided any specific notice to the applicant state.'28
Generally, the Appellate Body characterized the proceedings as "singu-
larly informal and casual," with applicants unable to estimate whether
the U.S. applied guidelines in a fair and just manner.2 9 These procedural
shortcomings thus amounted to a denial of basic fairness and due proc-
ess within the certification procedure. 3°
The Appellate Body, however, did not restrict its criticism of the
nontransparent and unpredictable certification process to abstract notions
of due process and basic fairness; noting that the U.S. requirements were
of general application and thus fell under article X:I of the GATT, it
elaborated on the necessity to administer them in a "uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner" as mandated by article X:3. 3' In this respect, the
Appellate Body held that:
It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 estab-
lishes certain minimum standards for transparency and
procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations
which, in our view, are not met here. The non-transparent and ex
parte nature of the internal governmental procedures ...
throughout the certification processes under Section 609, as well
as the fact that countries whose applications are denied do not
receive formal notice of such denial, nor of the reasons for the
denial, and the fact, too, that there is no formal legal procedure
for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an application, are all
contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of the GATT
125. GAT', supra note 53, art. XX (emphasis added).
126. Turtle/Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), supra note 119, para. 177.
127. Id. para. 180 (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. Id. para. 181.
130. Id.
131. Id. para. 182.
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1994. We find, accordingly, that the United States measure is
applied in a manner which amounts to a means not just of "un-
justifiable discrimination", but also of "arbitrary discrimination"
between countries where the same conditions prevail, contrary to
the requirements of the chapeau of [GATT] Article XX.132
This reasoning demonstrates that the Appellate Body views transpar-
ency as directly related to the fundamental international law principle of
due process.'33 Depending on how the latter is defined, one could also
argue transparency is inherent in the broader notion of reasonable, non-
arbitrary administration of measures. In any event, the fact that in Tur-
tle/Shrimp the Appellate Body explicitly mentioned transparency when
interpreting the obligations established by the chapeau of article XX and
article X:3 is an important indicator of the principle's recognized impor-
tance in international economic law.
3. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and
Man-made Fibre Underwear34
The final decision under consideration here is the Appellate Body
Report in the U.S.-Underwear case. The dispute arose when the United
States enacted transitional safeguard measures against imports of under-
wear from Costa Rica under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC), 131 claiming its domestic industry would otherwise incur serious
damage. Before the panel, Costa Rica not only challenged the safeguard
measures with a view to the material conditions the ATC imposes on
safeguards but also invoked article X:2 of the GATT. Because its claims
were only successful in part, Costa Rica then appealed the panel's ruling.
The Appellate Body's ruling neatly demonstrates how article X:2 em-
bodies the principle of transparency and thus calls for elaboration.
36
Having answered the question of applicability of article X:2 to
measures adopted under the ATC regime at least in concreto in the af-
firmative, the Appellate Body continued by emphasizing the underlying
rationale--or "policy principle"--of the publication requirements con-
tained in the article:
Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a prin-
ciple of fundamental importance-that of promoting full
132. Id. paras. 183-84 (emphasis added).
133. Weiler, supra note 11, at 78.
134. Appellate Body Report, United States-Restrictions on Cotton and Man-made Fi-
bre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-Underwear].
135. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), WTO Agreement, supra note 64, An-
nex 1A.
136. See Weiler, supra note 11, at 77.
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disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private
persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nation-
ality. The relevant policy principle is widely known as the
principle of transparency and has obviously due process dimen-
sions. The essential implication is that Members and other
persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental meas-
ures imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens,
should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic in-
formation about such measures and accordingly to protect and
adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of
such measures.'17
As this paragraph demonstrates, the Appellate Body not only gener-
ally affirmed the due process dimension of transparency but also
specifically recognized predictability as an essential aspect of the princi-
ple. One need not conclude that the legal regime established by the WTO
agreements confers individual rights to traders 38 to understand how the
welfare-maximizing effects of the international trade regime depend on
transparency and the predictability it establishes.'39 A lack of opportunity
to "acquire authentic information ... to protect and adjust ... activities
or alternatively to seek modifications" will burden and distort traders'
import and export decisions and make true competitive advantage in the
marketplace impossible to calculate. More importantly, however, the
Appellate Body made it clear in U.S.-Underwear that the transparency
principle is also legally important in the WTO context, as it is enshrined
in and forms part of the telos of article X of the GAT.
B. International Investment Law
There are also a number of cases which bear on the notion of trans-
parency in the area of international investment law. The most prominent
treatment of the transparency principle is found in the dispute between
137. U.S.-Underwear, supra note 134, at 21 (emphasis added).
138. For a good overview of substantive and procedural individual fights aspects in the
different agreements, see Steve Charnovitz, The WTO and the Rights of the Individual, 36
INTERECONOMICS 98 (2001).
139. Free trade theory rests on the economic insight that states that produce goods ac-
cording to their (relative) comparative advantage and then mutually trade for other goods will
exploit every comparative advantage and, consequently, create general welfare gains that
benefit all states. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND
TAXATION 313 (Ronald M. Hartwell ed., 1971) (1819). For a (too) critical account of the link
between Ricardo's widely accepted comparative advantage theory and the WTO regime, see
Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free Trade Prac-




Mexico and the Metalclad Corporation, a U.S. investor. Accordingly, the
following section will focus on the Metalclad case.
1. The Metalclad Case
The Metalclad case is important not only with regard to the transpar-
ency principle but also because it is one of the most noted cases litigated
under the state-investor process of NAFTA to date.140 Because the final
NAFTA award was subject to judicial review by a Canadian court'4 ' and
arguably one of the main reasons behind the NAFTA Free Trade Com-
mission issuing an "interpretative note" on the scope of article 1105 of
NAFTA, '4 2 the following discussion is split in three subsections, dealing
with the award, the review, and the interpretative note, respectively.
43
a. The Tribunal Award
It is not only its outcome but its very distinct and peculiar set of facts
which make the Metalclad case not just another "garden variety" expro-
priation case.' 44 Therefore, and with a view to the importance of its facts
for the transparency issue at hand, the following sections will elaborate
the "history of constant turmoil' '' 45 underlying the Metalclad case in
more detail than the facts of other cases so far considered.
i. The Facts
Initially owned by Mexican nationals, Confinamiento Tecnico de
Residuos Industriales, S.A. de C.V. (COTERIN) built and operated a
hazardous waste transfer station in La Pedrera, a valley within the mu-
nicipality of Guadalcazar (the Municipality) in the State of San Luis
Potosi (the State). '46 It is particularly notable that COTERIN initially op-
erated under authority granted by the federal government, while the
Municipality did not require any license for the construction or operation
140. Kelly M. Mann, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation: The North
American Free Trade Agreement Provides Powerful Private Right of Action to Foreign Inves-
tors, 35 URB. LAw. 697, 698 (2003).
141. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 89 B.C.L.R. 3d 359 (B.C. 2001) [herein-
after Metalclad, Appeal].
142. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, supra note 101.
143. Given the facts and developments after the award, this division is intuitive. See Todd
Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico: A Play in Three Parts, 2 J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT 685 (2001).
144. Id. at 686.
145. Courtney N. Seymour, The NAFTA Metalclad Appeal-Subsequent Impact or In-
consequential Error? ... Only lime Will Tell, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV 189, 189
(2002).
146. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, paras. 28-29.
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of the waste transfer station. 14 7 The federal government, however, ordered
the closure of the site in 1991 when COTERIN, without prior treatment
or separation, deposited 20,000 tons of waste on the site rather than
transferring it.'4 8 Soon thereafter, the company unsuccessfully applied to
the Municipality for a permit to build a hazardous landfill at the site.'
4 9
Eventually, a newly elected municipal government came into office in
1992 and confirmed the original permit refusal."O
In 1993, however, COTERIN received three permits to build the
landfill: The State issued a land use permit for a landfill, and the Na-
tional Institute of Ecology, a federal environmental agency entrusted
with the issuance of environmental impact authorizations, granted two
permits for the construction and operation of a hazardous waste landfill
at the site. 15
Waste treatment and disposal was one of Mexico's most pressing de-
velopment needs at the time, but it also promised huge potential for
increased economic growth, capital, and revenue. As a result, interna-
tional investors were keen to enter the Mexican waste disposal
industry.5 2 Accordingly, by means of the Eco-Metalclad Corporation
(ECO), one of its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries, Metalclad entered
into a purchase option agreement with COTERIN. 3 This agreement
made the purchase contingent on either the issuance of a municipal per-
mit to COTERIN or on a definitive judgment by a Mexican court stating
that such a permit was not necessary.'" While there is disagreement as to
whether the governor of the State had promised his support for the ven-
ture,15 it is undisputed that federal officials assured Metalclad that with
one single exception-a permit that would be acquired within a year-
all necessary permits had already been issued.'56 Relying on these prom-
ises and believing the rationale for the conditions was fulfilled,
Metalclad proceeded to complete the purchase and began building the
landfill, even though neither of the two initial conditions was formally
met."' It should be noted that in the course of construction, both federal
147. Id.
148. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, paras. 5-6.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, paras. 29, 31, 35.
152. Seymour, supra note 145, at 189-90.
153. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, paras. 2, 30.
154. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, para. 8.
155. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, para. 32.
156. Id. para. 33.
157. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, para. 8.
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and state officials inspected the site and received progress reports from
Metalclad."'
Late in 1994, after significant construction progress, the Municipal-
ity issued a stop order due to the lack of a municipal permit.'59 While the
federal government assured the company that "the Municipality lacked
any basis for denying the construction permit" and that the federal gov-
ernment "would issue the permit as a matter of course,"'' it suggested
Metalclad nevertheless apply for a local permit "as a matter of courtesy
to local officials."' 6' Accordingly, Metalclad immediately applied for a
local permit "to facilitate an amicable relationship with the Municipal-
ity."' 62 Moreover, both an environmental impact study conducted by the
Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi as well as an audit by the
Mexican Federal Attorney's Office for the Protection of the Environment
confirmed that with proper engineering, the site Metalclad had chosen
for the hazardous waste landfill project was indeed suitable.'
63
Metalclad continued and eventually finished construction of the
landfill in March of 1995. The governor of the State cancelled his par-
ticipation in the planned opening ceremony only one week before the
event; the State Coordinator for Ecology followed three days later.' 6 Al-
legedly, one day before the official opening of the landfill the State
Coordinator for Ecology also met with the mayor of the Municipality to
urge him to organize protests against the site to disturb the ceremony.165
Indeed, one hundred paid protestors significantly disrupted the planned
opening party, causing serious upheaval and hindering invited dignitaries
from entering the facilities for hours.' 66 As a result, the landfill did not
open and never has opened. 67 Metalclad did, however, engage in further
months of negotiations, had the prior environmental impact audit re-
viewed and upheld by independent experts, and continued to receive
federal permits and public statements of compliance with all relevant
regulations.' 6' Yet the Municipality did not change its position; instead,
158. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, para. 39.
159. Id. para. 40.
160. Id. para. 41.
161. See Weiler, supra note 143, at 687.
162. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, para. 41.
163. Id. para. 44.
164. See Weiler, supra note 143, at 688.
165. Id.; see also Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, para. 46.
166. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, para. 46.
167. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, para. 11.
168. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, paras. 47-48, 57; see also Todd Weiler,
Good Faith and Regulatory Transparency: The Story of Metalclad v. Mexico, in INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 701, 710 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
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thirteen months after the original request, in December 1995, it officially
denied Metalclad's application for a permit.
69
This denial is remarkable for a number of reasons.170 Not only did
the federal authorities never even consider a local permit necessary-and
on the contrary constantly assured Metalclad that it had obtained all nec-
essary authorizations-but "there was [also] no evidence that the
Municipality ever required or issued a municipal construction permit for
any other construction project in Guadalcazar ... .""' Furthermore, and
not surprisingly, "there was no evidence [of] an established administra-
tive process with respect to municipal construction permits in the
Municipality ... .""' While this absence of a regular administrative
process alone strongly suggests the Municipality had no power to regu-
late construction for environmental purposes, it is certainly an
insufficient explanation for its year-long delay in rejecting the applica-
tion.' Nor does this finding mitigate the fact that the Municipality
neither invited nor notified Metalclad of the Town Council meeting dur-
ing which its application was discussed and ultimately rejected.7
In order to get additional backing for its refusal to issue a permit
Metalclad arguably did not need in the first place, the Municipality tried
to obtain a court order preventing the operation of the landfill.'75 Metal-
clad, for its part, on January 2, 1997, finally initiated arbitral proceedings
against the Mexican government under chapter 11 of NAFTA." 6 The last
nail in the coffin of Metalclad's plan to operate the waste landfill was an
Ecological Decree issued in September 1997 by the outgoing governor,
who-three days before his term of office expired-declared the area of
the site an ecological reserve for the protection of rare cacti.1
7
169. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, paras. 47-50.
170. See Seymour, supra note 145, at 192-93.
171. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, para. 52.
172. Id.
173. Id., para. 50; see also Seymour, supra note 145, at 193.
174. Metalclad, Final Award, supra note 45, para. 54.
175. Id. para. 56.
176. Id. para. 58. In the arbitration the federal government had to defend the actions of
federal subunits that it opposed from the very beginning, making Metalclad an interesting case
to study the influence of international investment treaties on federal systems. See Matthew C.
Porterfield, International Expropriation Rules and Federalism, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
(2004). The international responsibility of the central government for actions of subunits,
however, is generally recognized in international law. See ILC Articles on State Responsibility
art. 4(1) (Aug. 14, 2001), annexed to GA Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001).




With regard to the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment
enshrined in article 1105(1), the NAFTA tribunal clarified from the very
outset that predictability and, accordingly, transparency are relevant
when interpreting and applying this provision:
An underlying objective of NAFTA is to promote and increase
cross-border investment opportunities and ensure the successful
implementation of investment initiatives ... [pirominent in the
statement of principles and rules that introduces the Agreement
is the reference to "transparency" (NAFTA Article 102(1)). The
Tribunal understands this to include the idea that all relevant le-
gal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and
successfully operating investments made, or intended to be
made, under the Agreement should be capable of being readily
known to all affected investors of another Party. There should be
no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters. Once the au-
thorities of the central government of any Party ... become
aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this
connection, it is their duty to ensure that the correct position is
promptly determined and clearly stated so that investors can
proceed with all appropriate expedition in the confident belief
• 178
that they are acting in accordance with all relevant laws.
The tribunal emphasized that Metalclad acquired COTERIN for the
sole purpose of creating the waste landfill after having inquired with the
federal authorities regarding the necessity of a municipal perrmit.7 Then,
"[r]elying on the representations of the federal government," as the tri-
bunal noted, Metalclad began the construction of the landfill "openly and
continuously."''8 o Metalclad was entitled to rely on the government's rep-
resentations and continue construction in good faith. 8' With a view to the
history of contradictory government statements regarding the necessity of
a local permit, the tribunal further held that "[t]he absence of a clear rule
as to the requirement or not of a municipal construction permit, as well as
the absence of any established practice or procedure as to the manner of
handling applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to a
failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by
NAFTA."'82 Moreover, the tribunal criticized the lack of opportunity for
178. Id. paras. 75-76 (emphasis added).
179. Id. paras. 77, 80.
180. Id. para. 87.
181. Id. para. 89.
182. Id. para. 88.
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representatives of Metalclad to speak at the Town Hall meeting, as well
as the irrelevant factors behind the decision to deny the permit.i
3
Taken together, these numerous substantive and procedural short-
comings made the insistence on, then the denial of, the municipal license
"improper."''M Therefore, the tribunal concluded that
Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and predictable frame-
work for Metalclad's business planning and investment. The
totality of these circumstances demonstrates a lack of orderly
process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a
Party acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and
justly in accordance with the NAFTA.'85
Thus, the Metalclad tribunal gave transparency a very prominent
role in interpreting the relevant standard of "fair and equitable treatment"
and accordingly based at least part of its holding on the lack of predict-
ability and clarity regarding the necessity of, and procedure for,
obtaining an additional permit. In sum, the tribunal found that Mexico
had violated its obligation flowing from article 1105(1) of NAFTA to
provide fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international
law.116 Accordingly, the tribunal awarded almost $16.7 million in dam-
ages plus legal interest to Metalclad.' 87
b. Judicial Review-International Economic Law
in National Courts
The tribunal's award constituted the first victory for an investor in
NAFTA chapter 11 investor-state arbitration, and thus the legal commu-
nity closely monitored the Mexican reaction to see how, and whether,
Mexico would accept the award.' While NAFTA does not contain any
express provisions for appealing chapter 11 arbitrations, 89 article
183. Id. paras. 91-93.
184. Id. para. 97.
185. Id. para. 99 (emphasis added).
186. Id. para. 101.
187. Id. para. 131. In its award, the tribunal also ruled that Mexico had violated NAFTA
article 1110 by allowing the "indirect expropriation" of Metaclad's investment through the
Municipality's actions and held that the environmental decree issued by the Governor was an
"act tantamount to expropriation." See id. paras. 104-12. These aspects of the award, however,
are-while posing fascinating questions of legitimate regulatory diversity, indirect expropria-
tion, and sovereignty-of minor relevance in an analysis of the transparency principle, and
thus this Note will not elaborate further upon them.
188. Weiler, supra note 143, at 697.
189. Scott R. Jablonski, NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute Resolution and Mexico: A Healthy
Mix of International Law, Economics and Politics, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 475, 514-15
(2004).
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11 136(3)(b) does indicate the possibility of an appeal in national courts.' 90
Asking the Supreme Court of British Columbia to set aside the award,
Mexico decided to appeal.' 9' Because of the international commercial
nature of the dispute and Canada's status as a UNCITRAL Model Law
state, the court treated the provisions of the British Columbia Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration Act'92 as the applicable law. Hence, the
only three grounds for appeal were improper constitution of the panel,
violation of British Columbia public policy, and excess of jurisdiction.'93
In addition to this obviously limited scope of review, it should also be
noted that in the leading Canadian precedent dealing with review of arbi-
tral awards, the British Columbia Court of Appeals expressly recognized
that deference should be accorded to the arbitrators and judicial interven-
tion should be minimized.' 94 Indeed, before further scrutinizing the
Metalclad award, the Vancouver Judge, Justice Tysoe, himself quoted
this precedent' 95 and acknowledged that "even if it can be shown that the
arbitration panel has erred in interpreting the contract," the appeal pro-
ceedings could not set aside the award if the tribunal's "interpretation is
one which the words of the contract can reasonably bear."'
196
Given this acknowledged precedent arguing in favor of limited re-
view, the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court is
surprising: '97 Justice Tysoe ruled that a government's failure to act in a
clear, predictable, and transparent manner did not constitute a breach of
the "fair and equitable treatment" obligation enshrined in article 1105(1)
190. This provision stipulates that awards may not be enforced until a three month period
following rendering of the award has passed or all available appeals are exhausted. Thus, ap-
peal is possible if the parties agree to arbitration under ICSID Additional Facility Rules or
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In cases brought under the ICSID Convention, internal review
and annulment proceedings are the only available mechanisms.
191. Metalclad and Mexico had chosen Vancouver, British Columbia (Canada) as situs of
the original NAFrA arbitration because it seemed to be an adequate, neutral location. See
Weiler, supra note 143, at 697.
192. British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 233
(1996).
193. Id. at § 34. Mexico had unsuccessfully argued that the local British Columbia
Commercial Arbitration Act should be applicable, which would have provided for a more
extensive appeal on issues of law.
194. Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., 1 W.W.R. 219, 229 (B.C.C.A. 1991)
[hereinafter Quintette Coal].
195. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, paras. 51-52. Moreover, Todd Weiler draws
attention to the fact that Justice Tysoe apparently is an insolvency and bankruptcy law special-
ist without any particular background in international law. See Weiler, supra note 143, at 697
n.39. This observation makes second-guessing by "ordinary judges" of the merits of an arbi-
tration award rendered by international law experts all the more dubious.
196. Quintette Coal, supra note 194, at 229-30.
197. See Seymour, supra note 145, at 198; see also Weiler, supra note 143, at 699.
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of NAFTA and thus overturned the tribunal's award in this respect.'98
Commentators have argued that in doing so, he substituted his own in-
terpretation of article 1105(1) for the unanimous interpretation of the
expert Metalclad tribunal,' 99 thereby effectively violating his obligation,
outlined above, to give deference to the arbitrators. 20' It is indeed possi-
ble to demonstrate that Justice Tysoe did not limit himself to findings on
improper constitution of the panel, violation of British Columbian public
policy, and excess of jurisdiction.0' More importantly for this Note,
however, his interpretation of the role transparency plays within the
NAFTA framework in general and article 1105(1) in particular was not
only rendered without jurisdictional authority but was also flawed.
With regard to the question of jurisdiction, the court based its judg-
ment on the assertion that the Metalclad tribunal did not merely
misinterpret the wording of article 1105(1) but instead "misstated the
applicable law to include transparency obligations and.., made its deci-
sion on the basis of the concept of transparency.' '2°2 In order to reach this
conclusion, however, Justice Tysoe extensively discussed the "correct"
interpretation of the words "international law," which describe the mini-
mum standard of protection that is to be awarded to investors, criticizing
not only the merits of the Metalclad tribunal but also the Final Merits
Awards in the Pope & Talbot case and a separate opinion attached to the
S.D. Myers award. 2°' He concluded that he was "unable to agree with the
reasoning of the Pope & Talbot tribunal" and its "interpretation" of arti-
cle 1105( 1).204 The court's interpretation and holding on the merits thus
extended far beyond the limited authority for review provided for under
the British Columbia International Arbitration Act. In sum, the court
claimed to find "excess of jurisdiction" when in reality it inappropriately
engaged in a detailed-and again, it is submitted, flawed-analysis of
198. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, paras. 70-72. With a view to the other, non-
transparency related findings under NAFrA article 1110(1), however, Metalclad prevailed, as
Justice Tysoe did not consider the finding regarding the ecological decree "patently unreason-
able." Accordingly, he reduced the damages to reflect his judgment that there was no violation
of NAFTA obligations before the decree and awarded Metalclad $15.6 million. See id. paras.
97, 105, 134-37.
199. Weiler also notes that the composition of the panel included well-renowned experts
Professor Sir Eli Lauterpacht, former U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, and Presi-
dent of the OAS Inter-American Judicial Committee Jose Luis Siqueiros. See Weiler, supra
note 143, at 699 n.45.
200. Seymour, supra note 145, at 209.
201. See id.
202. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, para. 70.
203. Id. paras. 64, 68-69. See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL Award,
(Apr. 10, 2001) available at http://www.investmentclaims.com; S.D. Myers v. Canada,
UNCITRAL Separate Concurring Opinion, paras. 224-58 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://
www.investmentclaims.com.
204. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 14 1, para. 65.
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the structure and meaning of article 1105, putting particular emphasis on
the meaning and content of "international law" and substituting its own
construction of the phrase for that of the tribunal. As will be demon-
strated in turn, the tribunal's interpretation is not only one that the
wording of article 1105(1) can "reasonably bear" but actually is more
convincing than the British Columbian court's reading.
With regard to the status of the transparency principle in interna-
tional economic law, the actual reasoning Justice Tysoe put forward to
support his conclusion that there was no violation of article 1105(1) is
even more important than the fact that he exceeded his judicial authority
in doing so in the first place.20 5 First of all, his interpretation of article
102 is dubious at best. While acknowledging that article 102(1) refers to
transparency, he emphasizes that "it is listed as one of the principles and
rules contained in the NAIFTA through which the objectives are elabo-
rated."'2 6 According to Justice Tysoe, because NAFTA only requires
interpretation in the light of its objectives, it follows that not "all of the
provisions of NAFTA are to be interpreted in light of the principles and
rules mentioned in Article 102(1).y 207 A close reading of article 102 of
NAFTA, the agreement's key interpretative provision, however, demon-
strates that the court's reasoning is not convincing. Article 102(1)
enumerates "[t]he objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more spe-
cifically through its principles and rules, including national treatment,
most-favored nation treatment and transparency." 2° As mentioned above,
article 102(2) then stipulates that "[t]he Parties shall interpret and apply
the provisions of this Agreement in the light of the objectives set out in
paragraph 1.,,209 Given both the clear command to interpret the provisions
in light of NAFTA's objectives and the fact that the transparency princi-
ple "elaborates" those objectives, it is hard to see how Justice Tysoe
could deny the relevance of transparency in the interpretation of article
1105(1). His claim that chapter 18 of NAFTA exclusively codified the
transparency principle does not logically follow from the wording, nor is
it true; in fact, NAFTA is "positively riddled with transparency enhanc-
,,210ing norms, many of which are not found in chapter 18."1
What, then, would be a more reasonable construction and interpreta-
tion of the norm? Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
205. This fact might, however, diminish the precedential and persuasive value of the
case.
206. Metalclad, Appeal, supra note 141, para. 71.
207. Id.
208. NAFrA, supra note 85, art. 102(1).
209. Id. art. 102(2).
210. Weiler, supra note 143, at 701.
211. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. Weiler, supra note 143, at 701 n.52, lists articles
509-10, 718-19, 909-10, 1008-16, 1306 and 1411.
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Treaties (VCLT) stipulates that the ordinary meaning of words must be
interpreted in the light of the context, object, and purpose of the agreement
at issue.12 This Note has enumerated both the objective of inducing in-
vestment explicitly mentioned in the preamble of NAFTA and the
undeniable positive effects transparent rules and procedures bear in this
regard."3 The purpose of the agreement, therefore, clearly argues in favor
of interpreting articles relevant to investment decisions with a view to
transparency. The literal and contextual interpretation of the norm sup-
ports this teleological aspect as well: because article 102(l)(c) explicitly
lists as one of NAFTA's objectives the substantial increase of "invest-
ment opportunities in the territories of the Parties," the interpretation of
the corresponding investment chapter-including article 1105-must
take into account this goal. Nothing less is expressed in the interplay
between article 102(1), article 102(2), and the later implementing chap-
ters.
Moreover, Justice Tysoe misread the tribunal award as stating that
there was a causal relationship between a breach of the transparency
norms of chapter 18 and the finding of a violation of article 1105 of
NAFTA. This is, however, not the case; the tribunal simply followed the
interpretative techniques enshrined in article 31 of the VCLT and looked
at chapter 18, among other sources, when analyzing the context of chap-
ter 11 in order to interpret the obligations found in NAFTA article
1105. 2'4 Thus, the tribunal's approach is not only perfectly legitimate but
reasonable and justified under international law. In short, the court's
finding that there were no explicit transparency obligations in chapter 11
of NAFTA ignores the object and purpose of the treaty1 5 and, conse-
quently, does not support the conclusion that the transparency principle
was not relevant in interpreting NAFTA article 1105.
c. The Interpretative Note and Its Effects
With a view to the obvious shortcomings of the British Columbia
Supreme Court's reasoning, one would hope that if the NAFTA parties
decided to clarify the scope and meaning of article 1105, they would do
so by supporting the existing tribunal precedent and rebuking Justice
Tysoe's overly narrow misconstruction. That was not the case, however.
212. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 (1),May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
213. See Parts II.B. 1. and II.C.2. supra.
214. Seymour, supra note 145, at 217.
215. VCLT, supra note 212, art. 31(1).
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Apparently alarmed by the outcome in Metalclad and the subsequent
Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers cases,26 the trade ministers from each
Party came together as the Free Trade Commission (FTC) and issued
their Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions on July 31, 2001,
pursuant to article 1131(2) of NAFTA. 2 7 To the extent that this interpre-
tation touches on the present analysis of the status of transparency in
international investment law, the FTC "clarified" the scope of article
1105 by proclaiming:
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with Interna-
tional Law
Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum stan-
dard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of
another Party.
The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protec-
tion and security" do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
A determination that there has been a breach of another provi-
sion of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement,
does not establish that there has been a breach of Article
1105(l)."'
While some commentators have argued that this "interpretative note"
amounted to a de facto amendment of the agreement, thereby bypassing
the appropriate procedure and rendering itself void,219 the following
analysis assumes for the sake of discussion that the interpretative note is
not invalid for reasons of form. Nevertheless, if the interpretative note
intended to change the outcome in cases like Metalclad, its last para-
graph apparently repeats Justice Tysoe's mistake of linking the tribunal's
mention of NAFTA chapter 18 to its finding of a violation. In fact, the
tribunal never established such a causal relation-and the finding of an
additional breach certainly cannot preclude the possibility of a violation
216. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, supra note 203; S.D. Myers v. Canada, UNCITRAL
First Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com. See also
Weiler, supra note 143, at 704.
217. See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, supra note 101.
218. Id.
219. See Courtney C. Kirkman, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. United
States and the Narrowing Scope of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW & POL'Y INTL'L Bus. 343,
372 et seq. (2002).
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of article 1105(1).220 Insofar as this paragraph could be understood to
exclude the transparency principle found in article 102(1) from the inter-
pretation of article 1105(1), it contradicts the explicit interpretative
command enshrined in article 102(2) and thus cannot bind tribunals.22'
Therefore, the third paragraph does not affect the present analysis of the
status of transparency in international economic law.
Regarding the explicit restriction of article 1105(1) to the "custom-
ary international law minimum standard" in the second paragraph, one
could argue that due to the transparency enhancing provisions found in
countless BITs, other multilateral investment treaties, and NAFTA itself,
as well as with a view to the due process component of transparency, the
principle has indeed gained relevance in interpreting the customary in-
ternational law minimum standard guaranteed by fair and equitable
treatment or expropriation provisions. Indeed, the law has evolved since
the proclamation of the Neer standard:
222
[W]hat customary international law projects is not a static pho-
tograph of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens as it
stood in 1927, when the Award in the Neer case was rendered.
For both customary international law and the minimum standard
of treatment of aliens it incorporates, are constantly in a process
of development.223
Thus, in contrast to the more expansive reading of the Pope & Talbot
tribunal, which explicitly held that article 1105(1) included a certain
"additive" compared to customary international law, it is unclear whether
the Metalclad tribunal would have had to decide the case differently if
the interpretative note had controlled its interpretation.224
d. Conclusion
The Metalclad case was the first and most famous case to demon-
strate that, at least in the opinion of the NAFTA tribunal, transparency is
not exclusively concerned with procedures and due process obligations but
also features prominently as an interpretative principle for other NAFMA
obligations relevant to investment. Given the general framework and ob-
jective of investment treaties, this reading is convincing and potentially
220. Seymour, supra note 145, at 220.
221. Weiler, supra note 143, at 706. This question therefore is closely related to the issue
of whether the note should actually be considered an amendment, which would be the only
way to change the relevance of NAFTA article 102(1) to interpret the agreement's obligations.
222. See Kirkman, supra note 219, at 386.
223. ADF Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, para. 179 (Jan. 9, 2003),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ADF-award.pdf.
224. Seymour, supra note 145, at 220. In this regard, also see the approach adopted in
Waste Management, infra Part III.B.2.
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has significant implications for the understanding of fair and equitable
treatment clauses, which can be found in many other instruments of in-
ternational investment law as well. In contrast to the tribunal's
interpretation, the judgment by the British Columbia Supreme Court is
flawed for several reasons and consequently should have minimal im-
pact. Moreover, because national courts cannot bind international
tribunals and their conclusions on matters of international law are there-
fore of limited value, the reasoning of the appeal should not function as a
powerful precedent outside of British Columbia. 2' The influence of the
interpretative note is more difficult to assess. In light of the above analy-
sis, however, this Note argues that the outcome could very well have
been the same. A survey of additional jurisprudence will bolster this as-
sumption.
2. Additional Jurisprudence: Tecmed, Maffezini,
Waste Management, and Occidental
Even though the controversy surrounding the Metalclad decision and
its resulting fame-or notoriety, depending on who tells the story-is
unsurpassed, it is not the only judgment in international investment law
to employ an analysis connecting a lack of transparency with a violation
of the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment. Hence, a num-
ber of additional cases are briefly discussed below.
a. Tecmed
The survey begins with Ticnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v.
United Mexican States (Tecmed) 27 As in Metalclad, the dispute arose in
the context of a hazardous waste site in Mexico, although T6cnicas Me-
dioambientales Tecmed, S.A. had operated the site for a year before the
Mexican government declined to relicense it.228 Relying on various rights
and protections set out in the BIT between Spain and Mexico, the Span-
ish investor filed a claim with the ICSID Additional Facility. The
claimant suspected the refusal to relicense was not motivated by legal
considerations but caused by the change of administration, following
elections in 1997, in the Municipality of Hermosillo, where the landfill
was located. 9 In another parallel to Metalclad, local politicians and ad-
ministrators encouraged protestors to block access to the landfill.23°
225. Seymour, supra note 145, at 220.
226. See Weiler, supra note 168, 701.
227. Tdcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2
(May 29, 2003), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com.
228. Id. para. 39.
229. Id. para. 42.
230. Id.
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Issues of competence in the federal system arose as well: the Federal
Environmental Protection Attorney's Office (PROFEPA) investigated
certain breaches of the original permit; the federal agency, however,
came to the conclusion that neither the environment nor the health of the
population were threatened and thus refrained from revoking the license,
imposing fines instead .2
The tribunal criticized the lack of predictability and transparency in
the administrative municipal process that finally culminated in the de
facto revocation of the license. Addressing the obligation within the BIT
to provide fair and equitable treatment, it held that
this provision of the Agreement, in light of the good faith princi-
ple established by international law, requires the Contracting
Parties to provide to international investments treatment that
does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into ac-
count by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign
investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all
rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as
the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such• 232
regulations.
The tribunal then went on to state that in the present case, actions by
the Mexican authorities lacked sufficient clarity and "an explicit, trans-
parent and clear warning" that a necessary license would be revoked.233
Consequently, "contradictions and lack of transparency" hindered the
investor from taking action against losing his permit.24 Even though this
reasoning possibly demonstrates a stronger and more distinct connection
to notions of due process and good faith than the Metaclad award, 235 it
nevertheless strongly resembles the Metalclad tribunal's approach to
interpreting the fair and equitable treatment obligation, and it reiterates
that the predictability component of transparency identified above is cen-
tral to the effective protection of investments.
231. Id. para. 43.
232. Id. para. 154 (emphasis added).
233. Id. para. 160.
234. Id. para. 162.
235. See the analysis in Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Invest-





The setting of the next case is slightly different from the previous
contexts: not only do we (for now) leave the realm of hazardous waste
sites in Mexico, but more importantly, the case was brought against an
industrialized state-which is noteworthy, considering BITs are often
viewed as one-sided agreements in favor of claimants from the industri-
alized parties.236 In Maffezini (Argentine) v. Kingdom of Spain,237 the
claimant established a corporation named Emilio A. Maffezini S.A.
(EAMSA) in the Spanish province of Galicia.238 A Spanish entity, So-
ciedad para el Desarrollo Industrial de Galicia (SODIGA), functioned as
a minority shareholder and also granted a large loan at a preferential in-
terest rate to the company.2 39 At the time, SODIGA was in the process of
transforming from a state-oriented to a market-oriented entity, but it still
evidenced features of a public entity whose actions could in part be at-
tributed to the Spanish state.2" Early in its developmental stage, EAMSA
experienced financial difficulties and consequently needed additional
loans and subsidies. Among the measures taken to cope with the com-
pany's financial crisis was the transfer of 30 million Spanish peseta from
the personal accounts of Emilio Maffezini to EAMSA, as ordered by a
representative of SODIGA who had the abstract authority to do so but
acted in the absence of a concrete loan contract between Maffezini and
EAMSA. 4' EAMSA's difficulties continued until Maffezini stopped all
construction, dismissed all employees, and tried to sell EAMSA's assets
to SODIGO.2 2 The deal was unsuccessful, and Maffezini instituted
ICSID arbitration, claiming that the project failed due to wrong advice
from SODIGO and that EAMSA irregularly transferred the 30 million
Peseta without concrete consent to the transfer.
In its ruling on the merits, the tribunal roundly rejected Maffezini's
main claim that Spain, acting via SODIGO, was responsible for EAMSA's
demise, famously ruling that it was predominantly Maffezini's own poor
business judgment that caused the business to fail. 3 With regard to the
236. See Andrew T. Guzman, Explaining the Popularity of BITs: Why LDCs Sign Trea-
ties that Hurt Them (Jean Monnet Working Papers, No. 12/97 VII, 1997), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.orglpapers/97/97-12.html.
237. Maffezini v. Spain, 5 ICSID Rep. 419, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Nov. 9, 2000).
238. Id. para. 39.
239. Id.
240. Id. para. 57.
241. Id. para. 75.
242. Id. para. 43.
243. Id. para. 64:
In this connection, the Tribunal must emphasize that Bilateral Investment Treaties
are not insurance policies against bad business judgments. While it is probably true
that there were shortcomings in the policies and practices that SODIGA and its
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unclear facts surrounding the transfer of money from Maffezini's per-
sonal account to EAMSA, however, the arbitrators found that "the lack
of transparency with which this loan transaction was conducted is in-
compatible with Spain's commitment to ensure the investor a fair and
equitable treatment in accordance with Article 4(i) of the [BIT]."2"
While it is regrettable that the tribunal did not further elaborate on
what it precisely meant by "lack of transparency,"2 45 the award at least
serves as another indicator that the connection between a non-
transparent action attributable to the state and the obligation to provide
fair and equitable treatment is increasingly recognized in international
investment law.
c. Occidental246
Occidental Exploration and Production Company (OEPC), a U.S.
investor, provided oil exploration services to Petroecuador, a state-owned
corporation responsible for the planning, organization, and operation of
oil explorations and exploitations in Ecuador.247 During the 1980s and
1990s OEPC regularly paid the value-added tax (VAT) on local acquisi-
tions and received reimbursement from Petroecuador. The two
companies, however, modified their contractual relations in 1999, trans-
forming OEPC into an equity participant responsible for making VAT
payments and then collecting applicable refunds itself.248 At the time of
the negotiations for the new contract, however, Ecuador's tax laws were
in flux. Therefore, OEPC tried to insure itself against unfavorable modi-
fications by, inter alia, inquiring beforehand with Servicio de Rentas
Internas (SRI), Ecuador's tax authority, as to whether the import of
goods under the new contract would give rise to VAT liability and in-
cluding a clause providing for new amendments to "reestablish the
economy" of the original bargain. 249 In response to this consulta, the SRI
explained that OEPC was indeed required to pay VAT, but it did not ex-
plicitly mention the possibility of a refund. Nevertheless, following the
signing of the new contract, OEPC applied for and initially received VAT
sister entities pursued in the here relevant period in Spain, they cannot be deemed to
relieve investors of the business risks inherent in any investment. To that extent, it is
clear that Spain cannot be held responsible for the losses Mr. Maffezini may have
sustained any more than would any private entity under similar circumstances.
244. Id. para. 83.
245. See Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 235, at 37.
246. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, Final Award, Case No. UN 3467,
London Ct. Int'l Arb. (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com.
247. Id. para. 25.
248. Id. paras. 26-28, 30, 95-96.
249. Id. paras. 102-05.
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refunds from SRI.25 ' Eventually, however, the tax authority changed its
position and claimed OEPC already received reimbursement by means
of its contractual equity participation with Petroecuador and was not eli-
gible for further refunds under applicable Ecuadorian tax laws. 5 OEPC
resorted to arbitration under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.
When discussing the question of whether OEPC's investment had
been impaired, the tribunal, in an obiter dicta, clearly voiced its discon-
tent over the state of the Ecuadorian tax laws: "SRI was confronted with
a variety of practices, regulations and rules dealing with the question of
VAT ... [T]his resulted in a confusing situation into which the SRI had
the task of bringing some resemblance of order."2 The tribunal's analy-
sis of the fair and equitable treatment claim first recalled the preamble of
the BIT, which states that such treatment "is desirable in order to main-
tain a stable and maximum effective utilization of economic resources,"
and concluded that such "stability of the legal and business framework is
thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment"2 3 It proceeded
to criticize the reply to OEPC's consulta as "wholly unsatisfactory and
thoroughly vague" and emphasized that the Ecuadorian tax law had been
changed "without providing any clarity about its meaning and extent and
the practice and regulations were also inconsistent with such changes. 2 4
Citing the pertinent parts of Metalclad and Tecmed, discussed above, the
tribunal concluded that SRI's non-transparent changes and application of
tax laws did not provide the stability mandated by the obligation to pro-
vide fair and equitable treatment. Given that this was an "objective
requirement that does not depend on whether the Respondent has pro-
ceeded in good faith or not," the tribunal found that Ecuador breached
the fair and equitable treatment provision of the BIT. 5
This case is not only noteworthy because it is the first non-NAFTA
investment arbitration award concerning tax issues but also because of
the award's "somewhat disconcerting" potential breadth.256 The main
reason for this worry is that while a certain level of "regulatory uncer-
tainty" as a product of governmental activity is generally considered
250. Id. paras. 103-08.
251. Id. paras. 32-34.
252. Id. para. 163. OEPC's claim of an impairment of the investment was ultimately
denied, however, because OEPC continued to exercise all relevant rights to operate, maintain,
use, enjoy, acquire, expand, and dispose of its investment. See id. para. 161.
253. Id. para. 183.
254. Id. para. 184.
255. Id. paras. 185-87.
256. Susan D. Franck, International Decision: Occidental Exploration & Production Co.
v. Republic of Ecuador, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 677 (2005).
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acceptable , 7 scholars have interpreted the tribunal's language to suggest
a change in regulatory framework during the life of an investment may
infringe the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment regardless of the
intention of the government. 8 While the wording and structure of the
award are indeed somewhat unfortunate and thus leave room for sweep-
ing interpretations, given the tribunal's emphasis on clarity and the
precedents, there is no reason to fear that the obligation to provide fair
and equitable treatment demands a completely "static" legal environment
and prohibits modifications. Rather, the concept of stability denotes the
absence of arbitrariness and utterly unforeseeable change.
The tribunal itself has expressed its belief that "in the instant case
the treaty standard is not different from that required under international
law concerning both the stability and predictability of the legal and busi-
ness framework of the investment.' 259 Hence, by linking stability to
predictability, it becomes clear that a legal and business framework that
remains transparent-and thus predictable as far as the proper applica-
tion of the respective rules in force is concerned--does not become
"unstable" through an amendment of the relevant norms. In a similar
vein, the tribunal's observation that "there is certainly an obligation not
to alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has
been made" 26° should not be understood as prohibiting changes to all
laws affecting investment per se but should be construed as requiring
that a transparent and predictable business environment keep those char-• 261
acteristics, no matter how the applicable rules in concreto evolve.
Taking everything into account, the Occidental award thus stands as ad-
ditional support for the proposition that obligations of fair and equitable
treatment should be interpreted with a view to transparency.
d. Waste Management
The last case for discussion in this section returns the focus to waste
landfills in Mexico and chapter 11 of NAFTA. In the case of Waste
257. The boundaries of what is acceptable in this respect are usually described by some
form of "void for vagueness" doctrine, which emanates from basic principles of the rule of
law. It is, for example, reflected in art. 103 (2) of the German Basic Law and is also well-
known to U.S. administrative and tax law. Franck opines that this award could thus be the
beginning of a "void for vagueness" doctrine in international investment arbitration. Id. at 678.
258. See Franck, supra note 256, at 680, arguing that the award thus even "takes matters
a step further" than Metalclad previously did.
259. Occidental, supra note 246, para. 190.
260. Id. para. 191.
261. See the similar interpretation of fair and equitable treatment by the tribunal in CMS
Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 274-77 (May 12,
2005).
[Vol. 27:579
Management, Inc. v. Mexico (Waste Management), the Mexican city of
Acapulco, in the state of Guerrero, entered into a contract for the provi-
sion of waste disposal services with Acaverde, a Mexican company
indirectly owned by Waste Management, a U.S. company. 263 The city not
only granted Acaverde exclusive rights to service a particular area but
also entitled it to develop a base of paying customers and receive
monthly payments from the municipal government, guaranteed by a lo-264
cal development bank in a separate line-of-credit arrangement. Finally,
the contract foresaw that Acaverde would construct a permanent solid
waste landfill on a piece of land the city was to transfer as a "gratuitous
loan.
,2 65
On August 15, 1995, Acaverde began operating under the agreement,
but the city fulfilled virtually none of its contractual obligations: The
land for the landfill was not available, Acaverde received hardly any
regular payments from the city, and the city did not properly enforce the
exclusivity arrangements for the concession area.26 Furthermore,
Acaverde encountered substantial problems with "trash pirates" (piratas)
who used unauthorized pick-up trucks to look for and dump waste, bar-
row-men (carretilleros) who would do small jobs, including waste
disposal, for a tip, and pig-farmers (porcicultores) who took waste food
from restaurants as food for their animals.267 When Acaverde finally
ended its operations in November 1997, about 80 percent of its invoices
to the city were still unpaid.268
The NAFTA panel ruling on Waste Management's claim under chap-
ter 1 1 decided the city had not violated article 1105 of NAFTA. Even
though the city government failed in numerous ways to fulfill its con-
tractual obligations, the panel did not find that Acapulco acted "in a
wholly arbitrary way or in a way that was grossly unfair.' '269 Instead, the
city had actually attempted to take steps to fulfill its obligations, and the
main problem with Acaverde's operations could be traced back to the
business plan, which did not anticipate the resistance by the local popu-
lace and the Mexican financial crisis.270
262. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (Apr. 30, 2004).
263. Id. para. 40. The indirect and complex ownership structure-at the time Waste
Management owned a Cayman Island holding company, which in turn owned Acaverde-
prompted Mexico to raise a procedural defense, asserting that Waste Management lacked a
direct interest in an investment in Mexico and thus did not have the status of an "investor"
under NAFFA Chapter 11. This defense, however, was not successful. See id. paras. 77-85.
264. Id. paras. 42-44,48-50.
265. Id. para. 45.
266. Id. paras. 54-58.
267. Id. para. 54.
268. Id. para. 69.
269. Id. para. 115.
270. Id. paras. 108-15.
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The inclusion of Waste Management in the present survey of trans-
parency-related cases in international investment law, however, is due to
the standard the tribunal introduced with regard to article 1105. Having
discussed a number of precedents, the tribunal noted:
[Diespite certain differences of emphasis a general standard for
Article 1105 is emerging. Taken together, the S.D. Myers, Mon-
dev, ADF and Loewen cases suggest that the minimum standard
of treatment of fair and equitable treatment [sic] is infringed by
conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if
the conduct... involves a lack of due process leading to an out-
come which offends judicial propriety-as might be the case
with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings
or a complete lack of transparency and candour in an adminis-
trative process. In applying this standard it is relevant that the
treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State
which were reasonably relied on by the claimant. Evidently the
standard is to some extent a flexible one which must be adapted
to the circumstances of each case.27
This formulation of the relevant minimum standard for fair and equi-
table treatment verifies that even after the FTC's interpretative note, the
transparency-related criteria developed in the Metalclad case-i.e., a
complete lack of transparency and bona fide reliance on corresponding
representations of the host state--can suffice to trigger liability, at least
under certain circumstances. Waste Management is therefore another
example and a sound and current summary of the relevance of the trans-
parency principle when interpreting the substantive obligation to provide
fair and equitable treatment in international investment law.
IV. PERSPECTIVES OF TRANSPARENCY
Given the relevance of transparency in the legal interpretations dis-
cussed above, this Part briefly discusses a proposal to further utilize
transparency. This proposal draws on and further develops Hansen's
suggestion that WTO panels adjudicating the legality of environmental
protection measures under article XX b) of the GATT require transpar-
ency as a balancing device.272
Hansen's idea has significant merits and could certainly be trans-
ferred to the other exceptions contained in article XX. The Appellate
Body has interpreted the chapeau of article XX, which requires that
271. Id. para. 98 (emphasis added).
272. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 1058 et seq.
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measures adopted under the provision do not result in arbitrary or unjus-
tifiable discrimination, as introducing a proportionality test.273 This test
opens the door for factoring in the transparency of a member state's do-
mestic legal process when balancing the respective competing interests
to decide the legality of a measure adopted under article XX. If the im-
posing state failed to transparently balance the impact of regulatory
measures on the import of goods with the protected interest at stake,
there could be a prima facie assumption that the regulation in question is
a disproportionate, protectionist aberration and not a legitimate public
policy choice.
Given that proportionality tests play an important role in other ar-
eas of the WTO legal order,7 a certain degree of transparency in the
domestic decision-making process could be considered a minimum
requirement for every member state relying on exceptions to general
obligations in the WTO agreements. This balancing approach would
not only guarantee that member states do not exploit exception clauses
for other purposes; it also would provide a valuable link between
members of civil society and the panels adjudicating cases, equipping
the latter with a solid record of the discourse between competing inter-
ests on the national level. 275 A similar interpretation could apply to other
sectors of international economic law containing comparable exceptions,
where transparency would facilitate compliance with international eco-
nomic law regimes and foster the legitimacy and democratic acceptance
of such regimes in member states.
Within the context of these proportionality tests, the Appellate Body
has also incorporated general principles of public international law.276
While it is clear that the GATT "is not to be read in clinical isolation
from public international law,' 2 77 the influence of general public
international law and its coordination with the WTO legal order remain
problematic. Building on the balancing role proposed for transparency
above, tribunals might mitigate possible conflicts between WTO
273. Turtle/Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), supra note 119, paras. 156--60.
274. For a good overview, see Axel Desmedt, Proportionality in WTO Law, 4 J. INT'L
Eco. L. 441 (2001).
275. Hansen, supra note 1, at 1065.
276. See Appellate Body Report, Turtle/Shrimp, supra note 119, para. 168.
277. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996).
278. See Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a
Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903 (2004); JAN NEUMANN, DIE
KoORDINATION DES WTO-RECHTS MIT ANDEREN VOLKERRECHTLICHEN ORDNUNGEN (2002);
specifically with regard to the duty to cooperate stemming from public international law, see
also Christian Tietje, Die volkerrechtliche Kooperationspflicht im Spannungsverhilnis
WelthandellUmweltschutz und ihre Bedeutung ir die europaische Umweltblume, 35
EUROPARECHT 285 (2000).
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obligations, on the one hand, and provisions stemming from multilateral
agreements not all WTO member states have undertaken, on the other,
by assigning significant weight to the transparent and bona fide
fulfillment of the latter when judging the conformity of a measure with
relevant WTO agreements.
Finally, transparency could also prove very beneficial in the context
of a problem peculiar to international investment law. Here, the question
of how to distinguish between legitimate public policy choices and indi-
rect or "regulatory" expropriations typically presents difficulties.279 While
transparency cannot fully resolve this issue, it can certainly provide valu-
able indications: If a state ponders and eventually enacts regulatory
measures rendering an investment worthless, the process should at least be
transparent and predictable so as to enable the investor to participate, safe-
guard his rights, and consider consequent business decisions ahead of
time. If the state conforms to this standard and fulfills other criteria con-
cerning the impact and duration of the regulation, its non-discriminatory
application, and its non-interference with distinct, investment-backed ex-
pectations,280 the tribunal should find there has not been an indirect
expropriation and should consequently deny the investor's compensation
claims. This requirement imposes no disproportionate burden on the host
state but rather functions to prove the regulation at issue is a regulatory
measure adopted in good faith.
V CONCLUSION
Weiler reminds us that according to Schwarzenberger, one should
not rush too quickly to announce new principles of international eco-
nomic law "based merely on a grouping of similar treaty provisions.28'
This caveat is generally well-founded, and accordingly, further interdis-
ciplinary academic treatment of this issue is warranted. This Note's brief
survey of relevant legal texts, however, shows that countless provisions
of different sectors of international economic law-trade, investment,
279. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings
Doctrine," 78 N.YU. L. REV. 30 (2003); Barry Appleton, Regulatory Takings: The Interna-
tional Law Perspective, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 35 (2002).
280. See Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in Interna-
tional Law, 20 ICSID REv. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 45-49 (2005).
281. Weiler, supra note 11, at 77-78. For a discussion of whether BITs can play a role in
the formation of customary international law at all or merely function as lex specialis between
the respective parties, compare Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 327, 329
(1994) and Asoka de Z. Gunawardana, The Inception and Growth of Bilateral Investment
Promotion and Protection Treaties, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 544 (1992).
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and finance--either reflect or even explicitly express the transparency
principle. This holds true for bilateral as well as for multilateral instru-
ments. While many of these provisions stipulate procedural obligations
to publish information of vital importance to market participants and
investors, there are a growing number of more substantive obligations
that either require interpretation with a view to the transparency princi-
ple or directly mirror the economic functions of transparency.
Increasingly, mere publication of relevant laws is insufficient. Instead,
international agreements are mandating opportunities to comment and
the active delivery of relevant information-complementing "passive"
transparency with "active" transparency."'
In the same vein, the jurisprudence discussed above demonstrates
how tribunals have recognized transparency as the underlying rationale
of international economic provisions and a vital component of the suc-
cess and functioning of the WTO and NAFTA legal orders, to name only
the most prominent multilateral examples. Notwithstanding remaining
controversies and open questions as to the exact relationship between the
different chapters of NAFTA, for instance, it appears certain that trans-
parency will continue to play an important role as an interpretative
device in international economic law. Hence, it does not seem premature
to refer to it as an interpretative principle of international economic law.
This result is all the more acceptable if one remembers the underly-
ing rationales of international trade and investment law: to create
predictability and foster trade and investment. Both of these goals are
greatly enhanced by applying transparency disciplines to the fields' sub-
stantive provisions. This is not to say, of course, that there are no
potential costs associated with transparency. There are quantifiable ad-
ministrative costs in addition to intangible, but equally serious, cultural
barriers to increased transparency."3 Given transparency's vast economic
benefits, however, it is in the self-interest of states seeking foreign direct
investment to overcome these obstacles-with technical assistance, if
necessary-and install transparent and predictable procedures even in
282. Regarding the distinction between the active and passive obligation to provide in-
formation and its implications for democratic legitimacy generally, see ANNE PETERS,
ELEMENTE EINER THEORIE DER VERFASSUNG EUROPAs 694 et seq. (2001).
283. In the context of procurement, it has already been noted supra Part III.B.l.b that
some developing and newly industrialized states seem particularly skeptical of increasing
transparency. For a critical account of the WTO transparency disciplines and their impact on
developing states' systems of governance, see Robert Wolfe, Regulatory transparency, devel-
oping countries, and the fate of the WTO (Mar. 1, 2003) (unpublished, delivered to
International Studies Association), available at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/
wolfe.pdf; for a general discussion of the costs and benefits of the normative concept of trans-
parency, see Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=686998.
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areas where international economic law might still leave them discre-
284tion.
Finally, the transparency principle offers a great analytical tool to
distinguish legitimate state regulatory action from protectionist or indi-
rectly expropriatory conduct. Properly viewed, transparency not only
functions to protect the investor or market participant; it also offers a
greater degree of certainty to the state that must decide on available pol-
icy objectives. By allowing international judicial bodies and tribunals to
consider a state's domestic decision-making process, transparency thus
guarantees a role for civil society's input on the international level.
284. See the empirical data complied by Zdenek Drabek & Warren Payne, The Impact of
Transparency on Foreign Direct Investment (WTO Staff Working Paper, ERAD-99-02, Aug.
1999), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?reflD=-24120; but see Guzman,
supra note 236.
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